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INTRODUCTION
In June 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel issued a
massive new manual intended to provide the U.S. military with its first unified
guidance on the international law governing armed conflict. U.S. armed forces
previously had to rely on individual service publications that were frequently
out of date and sometimes inconsistent, particularly with respect to the interpre-
tation of customary legal rules. The goal behind the new 1,200-page volume,
matter-of-factly titled The Department of Defense Law of War Manual,' is thus
admirable, and the effort long overdue. Unfortunately, as this Article will ar-
gue, the Manual fails to meet the real needs of our military personnel for defini-
tive, and accessible, legal guidance due to its critical shortcomings in both sub-
1. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP'T. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR
MANUAL (2015) [hereinafter 2015 MANUAL], http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-
June-2015.pdf. A new version, containing very minor updates was issued in May 2016; the most recent
update was issued in December of that year. See GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP'T. OF DEF.,






stantive content and form, while some provisions actually disserve larger U.S.
national interests.
Even if it was true in his age, the maxim famously attributed to Cicero,
"inter arma leges silent"-in time of war the laws are silent-has long since
2been rendered obsolete. Today, the conduct of hostilities is governed by a
complex set of international legal mandates contained in a large overlapping
body of multinational treaties and customary law rules. Although the long his-
tory of wartime horrors and the steady stream of media reports of atrocities in
current conflicts create the impression that the law of war is violated with im-
punity, this is not entirely accurate. While badly dated in some respects, the
U.S. Army's 1956 Law Of War Field Manual (FM 27-10, still in effect as of
early 2017), notes violators' liability to prosecution under both military and
regular domestic law, and proclaims "[c]ommanding officers of United States
troops must insure [sic] that war crimes committed by members of their forces
against enemy personnel are promptly and adequately punished." 3 Offenders
may also be prosecuted by the enemy, by third-party states relying on universal
jurisdiction, and by international tribunals. As British law of war expert Charles
Garraway noted in describing the essential functions of national military manu-
als, "If service personnel are expected to act within the law-and at risk of
prosecution in both domestic and international courts if they do not-then they
are at least entitled to know the standards by which they will be judged."4 The
United States thus owes its military personnel clear, comprehensive, and legally
authoritative guidance on the law of war.
The importance of law of war compliance goes well beyond avoiding
criminal prosecution, however. Violations undermine overall war efforts, di-
minishing prospects for success. In crafting this body of law, states struck a de-
liberate balance between permitting the military actions necessary to prevail,
and providing humanitarian protections for civilians and fighters placed hors de
combat by wounds, sickness, or capture. While less well-informed soldiers and
political leaders may chafe at perceived restrictions, in reality states have grant-
ed themselves all the authority necessary to prevail, including the right to use
lethal force even when it predictably results in "collateral" civilian casualties.
Astute U.S. commanders from the time of George Washington on have recog-
nized the strategic importance of complying with the rules of war in order to
maintain political support for their cause regardless of whether the enemy re-
ciprocated.5 Unsurprisingly, the Army's new counterinsurgency manual em-
phasizes this point, declaring that to "lose moral legitimacy" is to "lose the
2. GARY D. SoLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3-7 (2010).
3. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, Change No. 1, 182 (1976)
[hereinafter FM 27-10].
4. Charles Garraway, Military Manuals, Operational Law and the Regulatory Framework of
the Armed Forces, in NATIONAL MILITARY MANUALS ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 45, 47 (Nobuo
Hayashi ed., 2d ed. 2010).
5. See, e.g., DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, WASHINGTON'S CROSSING 375-79 (2004); SOLIS,
supra note 2, at 13.
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war," and describing how French use of torture led to its defeat in Algeria.6
Whether deliberate or inadvertent, noncompliance is costly. U.S. failure to fol-
low legal rules governing belligerent occupation fueled the initial Iraqi re-
sistance,7 for example, and revelations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib corre-
lated with the doubling of insurgent attacks.8 Providing military personnel ex-
explicit guidance on the law of war in a readily accessible form thus serves real
national interests.
The consensual nature of international law results in interstate differences
depending on which treaties a country has ratified, whatever reservations it en-
tered to them, and whether it has persistently objected to the formation of any
customary law rules. The law thus varies from state to state, at least at the mar-
gins, and militaries need tailored national legal guidance. This is particularly
true for the United States, which has not ratified the two Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were concluded in 1977,9 leaving its
personnel unsure which provisions of these key treaties they must follow as
customary law, which they may be expected to apply as a matter of policy, and
which mandates they can legally ignore. Moreover, success in coalition opera-
tions requires allies fighting together to know specifically what each participat-
ing force may and may not do.
A national military manual also serves an important signaling function to
enemies, alerting them to the standards with which they will be expected to
comply, and the crimes for which their captured personnel risk trial. The United
States relies upon the law of war as both a sword-granting the authority nec-
essary to prevail in conflict-and a shield, protecting U.S. personnel from ene-
my abuse; a comprehensive enumeration of recognized war crimes is therefore
essential to protecting our own personnel from unjustified prosecutions by oth-
er states.
Credible national manuals also play an important role in the larger inter-
national legal milieu, facilitating the evolution of customary international law
(CIL) rules. Although some U.S. officials have argued that "state practice"
should be assessed based only on conduct on the ground, the International
Court of Justice contends that "verbal" acts, such as views states express in of-
ficial manuals, also constitute evidence of such practice.' 0 Even more obvious-
ly, by identifying rules that a state is following out of a sense of legal obligation
rather than just policy choice, manuals provide evidence of the opinio juris
6. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, FM 3-24, p. 7-9 [hereinafter Counterinsur-
gency Manual]
7. See David Glazier, Ignorance is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the
U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 121 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Insurgent Attacks in Iraq Increase Again, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2005), usato-
day30.usatoday.com/news/world/lraq/2005-04-26-iraq-attacks-x.htm.
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol f]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 L.L.M. 1442, 1125
U.N.T.S 609-99 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 11].
10. See David Turns, Military Manuals and the Customary Law of Armed Conflict, in
NATIONAL MILITARY MANUALS, supra note 4, at 65-66, 68, 75-76.
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necessary for conduct to become binding customary law. As the leading mili-
tary power, there is little doubt that U.S. officials wish to have substantial in-
fluence on the evolution of the law of armed conflict. An authoritative top-level
U.S. law of war manual would serve this goal.
Public discussion following the Manual's original 2015 release initially
focused on media perceptions that it was biased against journalists, increasing
the risk for those seeking to cover events in conflict zones. Academic commen-
tators have subsequently addressed a handful of specific substantive concerns,
generally taking issue with one or a small set of positions articulated in the
Manual. A particular focus of this criticism has been the Manual's treatment of
"proportionality" and precautions in planning and conducting attacks." DoD
released a minor mid-2016 update, cosmetically rewriting the section on jour-
nalists without significantly altering its substantive content.1 2 This was fol-
lowed that December with a second update refining the treatment of propor-
tionality and requisite attack precautions, addressing some, but not all, of
13
critics' concerns.
This Article endeavors to move beyond these specific issues and provide
a broader critical appraisal than any work to date, assessing whether or not the
Manual's substance and form credibly meet our military's needs and advance
overall U.S. national interests.
Part I considers the Manual's place in the larger context of the law of war,
reviewing historical antecedents en route to establishing the appropriate scope
for a twenty-first century edition. It identifies several ways in which the Manu-
al fails to measure up to important core attributes for this type of work, such as
its uncertain hierarchical standing and lack of interagency concurrence. The
Manual's express caveat that it "does not necessarily reflect . . . the views of
the U.S. Government as a whole,"' 4 leaves military readers unsure if they can
count on national support if following its guidance, and undermines its external
credibility as an indicator of U.S. national opiniojuris.
Part II focuses on several problem areas in the revised Manual's substan-
tive content. Its approach to the principle of distinction, for example, effective-
11. See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Off Target: Selection, Precaution, and Proportionality in
the DoD Manual, 92 INT'L L. STUD. 31 (2016) (addressing the three issues identified in the article's ti-
tle); Jordan Paust, Errors and Misconceptions in the 2015 DoD Law of War Manual, 26 MINN. J. INT'L
L. (forthcoming 2017) (offering specific criticism of the Manual's treatment of several issues, including
herbicides and non-international armed conflict); see also A Readers' Guide to Our Mini-Forum on
DoD's New Law of War Manual, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 12, 2015, 2:07 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/25371/readers-guide-mini-forum-dods-law-war-manual (summarizing a
series of posts by eleven different authors providing these commentators' initial reactions to various
aspects of the Manual).
12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DoD Announces Update to the DoD Law of War Manual
(Jul. 22, 2016), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/852738/dod-
announces-update-to-the-dod-law-of-war-manual; LOW MANUAL, supra note 1.
13. For a complete list of these changes, see attachment to DoD General Counsel Letter of
Promulgation dated May 31, 2016 in the unpaginated front matter in LOW Manual 2016, supra note 1.
For a representative critique noting the mixed nature of the latest revisions, see Geoffrey S. Com, Initial
Observations on the Law of War Manual Revision: Three Ups/Three Downs, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 14,
2016 11:12 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/35531/initial-observations-law-war-manual-revision-
three-upsthree-downs.
14. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1.
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ly guts the law of restraining value about what can be attacked. Resurrecting
"honor" as a core principle while employing drones flown by invulnerable re-
mote operators-criticized as cowardly and dishonorable in target states
hands media-savvy adversaries a public relations bonanza exploitable to our
detriment. And its poorly supported claim of a U.S. right to use expanding bul-
lets-despite universal recognition of doing so as a war crime-places U.S.
personnel at significant risk of prosecution.
Part III examines flaws in the Manual's basic approach to law, including
its problematic use of sources, misunderstanding of international law concepts
such as "persistent objector" and "specially affected state," and overstatement
of the power of "lex specialis" to deny the application of human rights law to
conflict situations. It also gives inadequate recognition to the role of treaties in
CIL formation. These kinds of errors call into question the validity of many of
the Manual's assertions and will ultimately undermine its international credibil-
ity.
Finally, Part IV identifies shortcomings in the Manual's form and style,
as well as critical substantive omissions that impair its utility as a reference for
U.S. military personnel needing quickly accessible, complete, and authoritative
legal information. These defects include failing to authoritatively provide to
U.S. personnel the key information that they need with respect to war crimes
and which provisions of the two Additional Protocols of 1977 are binding on
U.S. forces. The latter is particularly ironic because providing guidance on the
protocols was the original impetus for developing a joint U.S. manual. 16
The Manual is not without its virtues. It fills some gaps in the sixty-year-
old FM 27-10, enumerating rules found in such newer treaties as the 1954
Hague Cultural Property Convention' 7 and the 1980 United Nations Conven-
tion on Certain Conventional Weapons and its associated Protocols." While
many pundits portray law as an impediment to military success,' 9 the Manual
stresses that it "poses no obstacle to fighting well and prevailing," 20 and ex-
plains why Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegmanier-the prior German assertion
that "military necessity could override specific law of war rules"-has been de-
21 22fmitively rejected. It takes a clear stance against renewed use of torture, de-
claring that "it would be unlawful, of course, to use torture or abuse to interro-
15. See, e.g., Doyle McManus, U.S. Drone Attacks 'Backfiring,' Congress Told, L.A. TIMES
(May 3, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/opinion/oe-mcmanus3.
16. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 184.
17. See id. at 1174.
18. See, e.g., id. at 1181.
19. See, e.g., Steve Benen, Carson Makes a Rare Endorsement of War Crimes, MSNBC: THE
NATION BLOG (Feb. 17, 2015, 9:20 A.M.), www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/carson-makes-rare-
endorsement-war-crimes.
20. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at ii.
21. Id. at 53.
22. This stance against torture came at a time when some GOP presidential candidates were
articulating renewed support for such practices. See Steve Benen, GOP Presidential Candidates Voice




gate detainees," 23 with a footnote showing coercion is counterproductive.24 The
Manual rejects "law-free" zones where detainees lack legal protection 25 and al-
so rejects determining legal status via the application of "conclusory" labels
such as "enemy combatant"; instead, the Manual requires individual fact-based
determinations.26 Ironically, given its initial issuance under authority of a for-
mer CIA general counsel, it makes the important point, overlooked by drone
proponents to date, that "only military aircraft are entitled to engage in attacks
in armed conflict," 27 repudiating the legitimacy of CIA drone strikes. This may
be internally contradicted, however, by problematic assertions (discussed in
Part II), that civilians employed by a state-as compared to "non-state" ac-
tors-can serve in traditional military roles).
Despite these positive attributes and modest changes made to the Manual
in 2016, this Article concludes that in its current form, the Manual fails both to
meet the needs of our military forces for accurate, concise, and authoritative
legal guidance, and to faithfully serve larger overall national interests. Exercis-
ing authority claimed by the Manual-such as using expanding bullets, or
overbroad definitions of what can be lawfully targeted-will predictably un-
dermine support for U.S. war efforts and redound to the advantage of its adver-
saries. Moreover, past prosecutions have definitively established that compli-
ance with national laws or directives is no defense to war crimes charges.2 A
credible law of war publication must thus reflect the most objective possible
assessment of current international law; anything less is a breach of faith with
the men and women called upon to risk everything in the service of their coun-
try. The DoD Manual fails this test, and should be officially withdrawn until it
can be brought up to an appropriate professional standard, or replaced with a
volume more faithfully serving the law, our armed forces, and America's true
national interests.
I. THE DoD LAW OF WAR MANUAL IN CONTEXT
A. The Purpose and History of Military Manuals
As its preface notes, this Manual is the latest entry in a genre that origi-
nated during the American Civil War with the colloquially titled "Lieber
Code." 29 Although knowledge of the rules of warfare was a core professional
competency for nineteenth-century officers, that conflict saw a massive influx
of individuals commissioned directly from civilian life without formal training
23. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 518 n.52.
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id. at 99.
27. Id. at 927.
28. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CR[MINALS 160-61
(1949).
29. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii; see also FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
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or military expertise. Columbia University professor Francis Lieber thus pro-
posed to write "a little book on the Law and Usages of War" to address the re-
sulting knowledge gap.30 After editing by Union commanding general Henry
Halleck (a leading international law scholar in his own right) and approval by
President Lincoln, it was issued to the Army as Instructions for the Government
of Armies in the Field under cover of General Order No. 100 in April 1863.31
The "rules of war" were more customary practice than formal law at that time,
32
so Lieber's slim volume was not just a restatement. Together with the 1864
Geneva Convention,33 providing the first treaty protections for the sick and
wounded, and the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, banning exploding bullets
because they inflicted unnecessary suffering, 34 the Code made a seminal con-
tribution to the development of the modern law of war.
Although officially distributed to the Union Army as an overall guide to
rules of warfare, some provisions relating to matters like the treatment of es-
caping slaves,35 retaliation for enslavement of captured U.S. troops,36 and the
treatment of rebels, 37 were logically intended for Southern adversaries as well.
Copies were provided to the enemy, and high Confederate officials, including
President Jefferson Davis and Secretary of War James Seddon, demonstrated
awareness of-even if not full agreement with-its content.38
Lieber's work provided the model for other national military manuals,
the unratified 1874 Brussels Declaration, and the Institute of International
Law's 1880 Oxford Manual.39 It also significantly influenced the formal codi-
fication of land warfare regulations at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences.
The Hague Convention rules, recognized as having become CIL by the Nurem-
berg International Military Tribunal, mandate that armies be provided instruc-
tions "respecting the laws and customs of war on land."40
General Order No. 100 was reissued as an expediency during the 1899-
1902 Philippine Insurrection. In 1914, the Army published a more comprehen-
sive Rules of Land Warfare, including Hague Convention rules, as a serialized
30. For a more detailed history of these developments, see David Glazier, Ignorance is Not
Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 155
(2005).
31. See id. at 155-57.
32. See Gary D. Solis, Book Review, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 281-82 (2013) (reviewing JOHN
FABIAN WITr, LINCOLN'S CODE (2012)).
33. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?
documentld-477 CEAI 22D7B7B3DC12563CD002D6603&action=openDocument.
34. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Saint Petersburg, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentid=3C02BAF088A50F61 C12563CD002D663B&action=openDocument
[hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].
35. LIEBER CODE, supra note 29, at 15-16.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 42-45.
38. JOH-N FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE 245 (2012).
39. See Glazier, supra note 30, at 159-63.
40. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land § 1, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277-309 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
[Vol. 42: 2222
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War Department document.41 By 1940, the Army's guidance had taken its cur-
rent form as Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Rules ofLand War Warfare, which was
last substantially revised in 1956 following U.S. ratification of the 1949 Gene-
va Conventions.42 That version remained in effect as of early 2017, with only a
minor 1976 change reflecting belated U.S. ratification of the 1925 Geneva Gas
Protocol.43 It thus fails to provide any guidance on the roughly two dozen law
of war treaties adopted since the Geneva Conventions."
The Army Judge Advocate General's School has informally promulgated
an annually revised Operational Law Handbook to lawyers in the field; several
dozen of each volume's 500-plus pages deal with the law of war. 45 But the
2015 preface cautions in bold text that it "IS NOT an official representation of
U.S. policy regarding the binding application of various sources of law, and
should not be used as such."4 6 It refers the reader to the DoD Manual while also
proclaiming that replacement of FM 27-10 with an updated edition (to be re-
numbered FM 6-27) "is imminent." 47
The Air Force Chief of Staff issued that service's only official law of war
publication, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of
Armed Conflict and Air Operations in November 1976.48 The DoD Manual
states that this publication was updated in 1980 and includes it among its list of
"frequently cited" documents. 49 But other sources report its rescission in 1995
without direct replacement.50 Like its Army counterpart, the Air Force JAG
School has provided informal legal guidance, publishing three editions of Air
Force Operations and the Law between 2002 and 2014.1 It too, carries a dis-
claimer, identifying itself as "secondary authority" and cautioning that it
41. WAR DEP'T, RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1914) (issued as Document No. 467 by the Of-
fice of the Chief of Staff).
42. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter First Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [herein-
after Second Geneva Conventions]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] [hereinafter, collectively, the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions].
43. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FM 27-10, 1 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS (ICRC),
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.xsp (last visited Jan. 10, 2016) (listing effective
law of war treaties and providing links to lists of signatories and parties).
45. Each version of the handbook issued since 2007 can be accessed via the Library of Con-
gress website, Operational Law Handbook, LIBRARY OF CONG., MILITARY LEGAL RESOURCES,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/operational-law-handbooks.htmi (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
46. DAVID H. LEE ET AL., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2015, at i (2015).
47. Id.
48. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET (AFP) 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW -
THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (1976).
49. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii, xvii-xviii.
50. See, e.g., Matthew L. Beran, The Proportionality Balancing Test Revisited: How Counter-
insurgency Changes "Military Advantage," ARMY LAWYER Aug. 2010, at 4, 4 n.4.
51. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii.
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"should not be used as the basis for action." 52 Moreover, neither of these JAG
publications- distributed only to serving lawyers-would be readily accessi-
ble by actual warriors.
The Navy has done the best job of providing legal guidance to its forces
via the periodically updated Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Op-
erations, which bears official status as a Naval Warfare Publication (currently
NWP 1-14M) and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP 5-12.1).5 It
provides concise, straightforward, stand-alone explanations of law of the sea
and law of war principles governing naval operations in both peacetime and
conflict. The Naval War College's International Law Department has produced
an "annotated supplement" containing detailed source information for those
wishing to assess the legal authority underlying specific rules.54
As the commanding officer of a guided missile frigate, author Glazier
personally kept a copy of the Commander's Handbook close at hand for quick
reference. Although the number of military lawyers has expanded over the past
few decades, the reality is that they are still generally remote from the scene of
most military operations, and typically located at much higher echelons of the
chain of command than those actually engaging in direct combat. In one au-
thor's experience, the closest naval lawyer was typically on the staff of the
commander located two rungs above him in the chain of command. Not exactly
someone he could demand immediate legal answers from in time-critical situa-
tions, or call upon-and expect to remain in command for long-if he had a
question about the legality of complying with an order from an immediate su-
perior. Moreover, commanders are personally responsible for the detailed train-
ing of their own units and the preparation of timely tactical guidance to their
subordinates, both of which require personal knowledge of the law and the abil-
ity to quickly find guidance about unanticipated situations or to refresh one's
memory when required.
The Army and Marine Corps have frequently made at least junior legal
advisors available to battalion-level commanders (essentially the equivalent of
a warship commanding officer) deployed to post-9/11 conflicts in Afghanistan
and in Iraq. But this does not obviate the need for a good legal manual. First
these lawyers generally lack significant prior experience with law of war issues,
and they need ready access to comprehensive guidance on the subject them-
selves. Moreover, actual ground combat operations in these conflicts often take
place on a much lower small-unit level, with key tactical decisions made by
non-commissioned squad leaders; junior officers commanding platoons; or, at
most, at company level. Realistically, none of these individuals will bring a law
of war manual to the battlefield, or consult one under fire even if they have a
compact electronic device with them. But they still need access to a well-
52. KIRK L. DAVIES ET AL., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL AIR FORCE OPERATIONS
AND THE LAW, at i (3d ed. 2014).
53. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii-iv, iv n.9.
54. See id. at iv nn.9-10. For the most recent version, see ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE




crafted, readily usable publication when preparing for combat deployments,
during after-action reviews, and while conducting training sessions for peers
and subordinates.
B. The Need for a Joint U.S. Law of War Manual
Our reliance on individual service manuals has seriously shortchanged
our warriors. Air Force personnel have lacked any official guidance for more
than two decades, while the Army's sixty-year-old volume is necessarily silent
on the many significant intervening legal developments. The naval manual has
excellent coverage of maritime matters, but predictably gives short shrift to
land warfare, requiring the Marines to promulgate the outdated FM 27-10 as a
supplemental Marine Corps Reference Publication55 while leaving naval forces
operating ashore, such as Navy special forces (SEALs) and naval construction
battalions (SEABEEs), in the dark about the extensive set of rules governing
land warfare.
Even if these volumes were all current and complete, having each service
provide its own legal interpretations makes no sense when U.S. military policy
is to fight "as a joint force." 5 6 The DoD mandates that U.S. forces "comply
with the law of war during all armed conflicts,"57 but the efficacy of joint oper-
ations is impaired if service participants bring differing interpretations of law
with them. Consider the potential legal chaos that could arise from Air Force
and Navy officers with divergent views about permissible targeting jointly
planning and conducting an air campaign; ground units calling for air support
might have different standards still. Moreover, since most military undertakings
are now coalition operations, allied forces must understand the legal restrictions
governing each other's conduct. This, too, requires clear national guidance.
Other leading nations are ahead of the United States in this respect. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) documents Australia, Cana-
da, France, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
Ukraine as being among those countries that already have unified military legal
manuals. The current U.K. version, available commercially from Oxford
University Press, is probably the single best summation of the law of war avail-
able today. 59 The United States is thus an outlier among leading states with its
plethora of official and quasi-official single service publications. 60
55. U.S. MARINE CORPS, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, MCRP 5-12.A (1976),
www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCRP%205-12.1A.pdf.
56. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE No. 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM (2011).
57. Department of Defense Directive Number 231 1.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, May
9, 2006 (incorporating Change I of November 15, 2010), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/231 l0le.pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive].
58. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Sources, III. Military Man-
uals, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/src iimima (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
59. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004)
[hereinafter U.K. MANUAL]. Author Glazier has used this manual as his primary text for law school and
undergraduate Law of War courses for a number of years.
60. See International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 58.
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C. Critical Shortcomings of the DoD Manual
Given that the United States was the first nation to provide its army an
authoritative, concise, and stand-alone publication explicating the rules for
conducting hostilities, one would expect the new Manual to satisfy these crite-
ria. Despite culminating more than two decades of effort,61 the new volume
nevertheless falls short in each one of these areas.
1. Uncertain Authority of the Manual
Each prior "official" manual, starting with the Lieber Code, has been dis-
seminated on the authority of an official or organization within the chain of
command and in a recognized format. U.S. personnel understand the hierar-
chical standing of a general order, field manual, or naval warfare publication.
But the Manual enjoys no such pedigree; it is simply a "manual," issued over
the signature of the DoD General Counsel62 -a civilian outside the chain of
command. A military lawyer might understand the General Counsel's role and
authority; most U.S. combatants would not. The one sentence cover letter states
only that the Manual was "promulgated pursuant to Department of Defense Di-
rective 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program (May 9, 2006),"63 failing even to
note that only versions of that directive incorporating Change 1 of November
15, 2010 include the relevant guidance. 64 That change expanded the General
Counsel's duties to require that they "[d]evelop and promulgate the DoD Law
of War Manual," declaring that it "will serve as the authoritative statement on
the law of war within the Department of Defense." 65 But there is nothing in
those portions of the directive addressed to the military branches that com-
mands each branch to respect the Manual. Instead, each service secretary is still
instructed to "[p]rovide directives, publications, instructions, and training so the
principles and rules of the law of war will be known to members of their re-
spective Departments."66 Fairly read, this language requires the continued pub-
lication of service-unique law of war guidance, and the Army's stated intent to
produce an updated field manual implicitly confirms this interpretation.67
The Manual itself never claims entitlement to any authoritative standing.
The preface merely describes it as a "resource" for DoD personnel 68 and says
that "[a]n effort has been made to reflect in this manual sound legal positions
based on relevant authoritative sources of the law . . . ."69
61. The preface says the Army and Navy agreed conceptually on this approach in the 1970s;
however, work on the volume began in the mid-1990s. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at v.
62. See id. at i.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., DIR. 2311.001E, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (May 9,
2006), www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/DoD/231 101p.pdf (providing the original directive text without
the change).
65. DoD Directive, supra note 57, § 5.1.3 (incorporating the relevant change).
66. Id. §5.8.1.
67. See LEE ET AL., supra note 46, at i.
68. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii.
69. Id. at v.
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2. Lack of Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies
Contemporary legal and political realities require that a credible law of
war manual be coordinated across the executive branch, particularly with the
Justice and State Departments. Although it may surprise some outside the U.S.
Government, the military is generally not the "go to" source for law of war in-
terpretations by national security decision makers. Many Americans had never
heard of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) until its con-
troversial opinions on post-9/ 11 interrogations came to light. While OLC attor-
neys got the law wrong in several important instances (and those opinions have
been rescinded), 70 the take-away is that senior officials are more likely to seek
law of war guidance from OLC than DoD. Indeed, the DoD itself sought OLC
guidance on interrogation and targeting questions. And it was State Depart-
ment Legal Adviser Harold Koh, not anyone in the DoD, who provided the ini-
tial legal justification for drone employment. 72 U.S. Government organizations
thus need a common understanding of the law so that the same answer is pro-
vided, regardless of who is asked the question.
Furthermore, the military no longer has a monopoly on U.S. war crimes
prosecution. Under both the War Crimes Act and Military Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction Act, current and former service persons, as well as DoD employees
and contractors, can face war crimes trials in ordinary federal courts. 73 If mili-
tary personnel are to rely on compliance with the manual as a shield from risk
of domestic prosecution, they thus need Justice Department concurrence that
the manual accurately reflects the law.
Similarly, the risk of foreign trial calls for coordination with the State
Department's Office of Global Criminal Justice to ensure that the United States
is operating on common ground as to what constitutes war crimes. Other State
Department elements, including the Office of the Legal Adviser and Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, should also vet the Manual for consistency with U.S.
legal interpretations. As the January 2016 Iranian detention of two U.S. Navy
boat crews demonstrated, the military often needs the State Department to have
its back.74 To facilitate this support, the DoD must ensure that the legal guid-
ance it provides to its military forces reflects the consolidated interpretation of
the U.S. Government.
The lack of formal Justice and State Department concurrence are thus ma-
jor red flags, highlighting the Manual's unsuitability for U.S. military use until
this shortcoming is rectified. And it should be quite clear that this Manual is not
a credible indicator of U.S. national opinio juris since it fails to speak for the
government as a whole.
70. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 142-58 (2007).
71. See id. at 152; CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS 233-34 (2015).
72. SAVAGE, supra note 71, at 242-43.
73. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2441, 3261 (2012).
74. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt & Helene Coooper, Iran's Swift Release of U.S.
Sailors Hailed as a Sign of Warmer Relations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-navy-crew-release.html.
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3. Problematic Definition of the Law of War
Modern international law divides rules addressing the use of force into
two distinct bodies: jus ad bellum, governing resort to force, and jus in bello,
governing the conduct of hostilities.75 This bifurcation has two important con-
sequences for conflict participants. First, liability for aggression-criminal vio-
lation of jus ad bellum-is limited to senior decision makers; subordinates need
only worry about conforming their conduct to jus in bello.76 Second, it clarifies
that participants in hostilities are personally accountable for complying with jus
in bello rules regardless of the legality of their side's resort to the use of
force. An individual fighter thus has incentive to obey the law of war even if
their side is the aggressor.
The overarching DoD Law of War Program directive recognizes this dis-
tinction, defining the "law of war" as:
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is of-
ten called the "law of armed conflict." The law of war encompasses all international
law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citi-
zens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a
party, and applicable customary international law. 78
Inexplicably, the Manual-presumptively drafted in response to that di-
rective-adopts a more expansive definition, defining "law of war" as "that
part of international law that regulates the resort to armed force; the conduct of
hostilities and the protection of war victims in both international and non-
international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships be-
tween belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States." 79
This departure has two potential consequences. First, it arguably under-
mines the Manual's legitimacy. The DoD directive provides the Manual's sole
claim to official status; by adopting a differing defimition, it logically fails to
respond to that mandate. If it does not, then it lacks any authoritative standing
whatsoever.
More importantly, the Manual's definition has potentially significant con-
sequences for "good order and discipline." Several modern U.S. military inter-
ventions, such as the 1983 Grenada invasion,80 the 2003 overthrow of Saddam
Hussein,8 1 and 2014 Syrian operations,82 have arguably violated contemporary
75. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTErN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2010) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES);
SOLIS, supra note 2, at 22; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 7.
76. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENCE 142-44 (2011).
77. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 3-4.
78. DoD Directive, supra note 57.
79. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, 7 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 38/7, 1 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983) (declaring the Grena-
da invasion "a flagrant violation of international law"); Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action
in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness ofInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984).
81. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 364 (2008) (noting
the personal statement by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that the invasion was unlawful and its
condemnation by numerous countries and international organizations).
82. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The U.S. Has No Legal Basis to Intervene in Syria, SLATE (Aug. 28,
2013, 5:17 PM), www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/view-from-chicago/ 2013/08/the-u s has_
[Vol. 42: 2228
Failing Our Troops
jus ad bellum mandates. The bifurcation of jus in bello and jus ad bellum rules
absolves individual soldiers from responsibility for the resort to hostilities, al-
lowing states to command service members to participate in operations without
risk that they personally violate international law by doing so. The Army thus
fairly sought to prosecute Lieutenant Ehren Watada for refusing to deploy to
Iraq on his legally naive belief that he would commit a crime by participating in
what he concluded was an "illegal" war.83 But defining the jus ad bellum as
part of the law of war creates a defense for future Watadas, letting them argue
for a right, or even an obligation, to disobey deployment orders if they decide
that a conflict is unlawful. The Manual itself declares, "[e]ach member of the
armed forces has a duty to comply with the law of war in good faith" 84 and
"must refuse to comply with clearly illegal orders to commit law of war viola-
tions."8 But no military can function effectively if its members can individual-
ly decide whether or not to participate in a particular conflict.
4. Requirement to Consult Other Sources
Prior U.S. manuals served as stand-alone references, but the new volume
specifically cautions that it "is not a substitute for the careful practice of law," 86
calling for consultation of "relevant legal and policy materials (e.g., treaty pro-
visions, judicial decisions, past U.S. practice, regulations, and doctrine)." 87 But
these are not things that personnel in the field have handy, or time to consult,
during operational planning. An "official" manual should provide definitive of-
ficial interpretations and obviate the need for reliance on external materials. 88
The fact that the DoD law of war directive continues to call for production of
individual service guidance89 further undermines the credibility of this publica-
tion as a resource for operational forces.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT ISSUES
Turning from these general concerns to specific content, the Manual's pe-
culiar treatment of several major areas of the law of war is specifically prob-
lematic, further undermining its utility as a reference for U.S. military person-
nel. This Part examines in detail the Manual's handling of core law of war
principles; its approach to the issue of unprivileged belligerents (an issue of
no_1egal-basis for its-actionin syriajbut that_won t stop-us. html.
83. See, e.g., John Kifner & Timothy Egan, Officer Faces Court-Martial for Refusing to De-
ploy to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/us/23refuse.html; Joel Roberts,
Associated Press, Army Officer Refuses Iraq Duty, CBS (June 7, 2006), www.cbsnews.com/news/army-
officer-refuses-iraq-duty/..
84. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1074.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. at 2.
88. See W.H. Boothby, Addressing the Realities, Development and Controversies Regarding
the Conduct of Hostilities, in NATIONAL MILITARY MANUALS ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (No-
buo Hayashi ed., 2008) 125, 126 (stating the importance of military manuals providing definitive state-
ments of national positions).
89. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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particular relevance to ongoing U.S. conduct of detention and trials at Guantd-
namo); and its treatment of several weapons, including expanding bullets, ser-
rated bayonets, and cluster munitions.
A. The Manual's Treatment ofLaw of War Principles
While the law of war consists of hundreds of specific rules defined by
both effective treaties and CIL, 90 it is also understood to incorporate several
underlying core "principles." The earliest of these to be formally recognized,
"necessity," was defined by the Lieber code in 1863 as "those measures which
are indispensible for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful accord-
ing to the modem law and usages of war." 91 By 1914, the Army's manual iden-
tified three key principles as the core of the unwritten rules of warfare supple-
menting treaty law: necessity; "humanity, which says that all such kinds and
degrees of violence as are not necessary for the purpose of war are not permit-
ted"; 92 and "chivalry, which demands a certain amount of fairness on offense
and defense, and a certain mutual respect between opposing forces."93 The
1956 Army field manual continues to refer to these three principles, although
neglecting to provide definitions for "humanity" or "chivalry." 94
While there is some variance between states and commentators as to
which principles they currently acknowledge and precisely how they denomi-
nate them, 95 the majority view now articulates four principles: military necessi-
ty, humanity (or unnecessary suffering), distinction, and proportionality. 96 Odd-
ly, and arguably contrary to U.S. national interests, the Manual seeks to
resurrect "honor" as a separate fifth principle. Honor, or chivalry, was typically
recognized as a fundamental principle through the early post-World War II pe-
riod, but it is typically portrayed as a subset of the principle of humanity to-
day,97 and reinvigorating its status has predictable adverse consequences for
U.S. interests.
Although the DoD Manual asserts that these principles have become less
important over time due to the growing body of more specific rules," they are
still of major significance because their general nature makes them adaptable to
changing circumstances and technology, which can place more specific rules at
risk of obsolescence. Perhaps even more importantly, the principles of distinc-
90. The ICRC CIL study identified 161 CIL rules; it did not assess the customary law status of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions which collectively contain more than 400 articles. See The Principle of
Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives, n.5 Customary IHL Database, ICRC,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl-rulrule7#Fn_37_5 [hereinafter ICRC CIL Study].
91. Lieber Code, supra note 29, at 7.
92. WAR DEP'T, supra note 41, at 13.
93. Id.
94. FM 27-10, supra note 3, at 3.
95. DiNSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITtES, supra note 75, at 4-8 (identifying only two
"cardinal principles": "distinction" (protecting civilians) and "unnecessary suffering" (protecting com-
batants), but recognizing "military necessity" and "humanity" as "driving forces" behind the law).
96. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 21.
97. Id. at 23-24.
98. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 51.
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tion and proportionality continue to impose critical constraints on the conduct
of any attack.
1. Military Necessity
The Manual's approach to necessity is more aggressively asserted than in
the U.K.'s counterpart volume, 99 but to its credit, the DoD version clearly de-
clares that military necessity "does not justify actions prohibited by the law of
war," refuting the prior German approach of "Kraegsraeson."l00 It asserts,
however, that necessity must be assessed across the larger scope of the conflict;
that is to say strategically, rather than on a local basis under prevailing circum-
stances. oi Most accounts of military necessity do not address this point per se,
other than in the context of attacks, where there seems to be a general consen-
sus that the military value should be judged across the full operation rather than
analyzed piecemeal-i.e., by treating each individual component separately. 102
The U.S. position is thus not plainly erroneous, but if its strategic view is meant
to be broader than the common approach to attacks, it will prove controversial,
if not untenable.
The Manual also challenges the notion, advocated by commentators such
as Nils Melzer and Ryan Goodman, 103 that there is now an obligation to use the
minimum amount of force in any situation-e.g., to capture, or wound, if pos-
sible, rather than kill. While the DoD view likely reflects the lex lata currently
accepted by states, the Manual does not help its cause by relying on a 1989
Hays Parks memorandum on assassination that states:
In the employment of military forces, the phrase "capture or kill" carries the same
meaning or connotation in peacetime as it does in wartime. There is no obligation to
attempt capture rather than attack of an enemy. In some cases, it may be preferable
to utilize ground forces in order to capture, e.g., a known terrorist. However, where
the risk to U.S. forces is deemed too great, if the President has determined that the
individual[s] in question pose such a threat to U.S. citizens or the national security
interests of the United States as to require the use of military force, it would be le-
gally permissible to employ, e.g., an airstrike against that individual or group rather
99. Compare id at 52 (defining military necessity as "the principle that justifies the use of all
measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the
law of war"), with U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 21-22 (defining military necessity as "permit[ting] a
state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by
the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict,
namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the mini-
mum expenditure of life and resources").
100. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 53 ("Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier-'necessity in
war overrules the manner of warfare"').
101. Id.at57.
102. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 94-95.
103. For an articulation of this view, see Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy
Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 819 (2013). The Manual cites earlier work by Nils Melzer and Jean
Pictet. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, 57 n.44 (citing JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 75-76; and Melzer, supra note 71, at 79).
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than attempt his, her, or their capture, and would not violate the prohibition on as-
.104
sassination.
This paragraph is addressing the jus ad bellum governing resort to force
in peacetime, not the jus in bello applicable during armed conflict. Even if we
accept the view of DoD that Goodman, Melzer, and Pictet misstate the current
law of war, a state only has the option to capture or kill at its true discretion un-
der the jus in bello-i.e., in an armed conflict. "Necessity," as the term is used
with respect to self defense, is a more stringent standard than the "military ne-
cessity" principle applicable during an armed conflict, requiring the use of
force to be a last resort (which must also be proportional to the threat).1 0 5 The
Manual itself notes that these are different concepts. 106 There is thus logically a
legal obligation to attempt to capture rather than kill wherever feasible when
force is employed in self-defense outside the context of an actual armed con-
flict. U.S. attempts to justify "targeted killings" of suspected terrorists are often
unclear as to whether a particular strike is part of an ongoing conflict or a sepa-
rate act of self-defense, endeavoring to apply the capture or kill rule outside of
armed conflict.' 07 This approach is controversial, and international authorities,
such as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions1 0 8 and the International Court of Justicel 09 criticize such killing out-
side an ongoing conflict as violating international law.
2. Humanity
The Manual next provides reasonably concise treatment of the principle
of humanity, which it defines as forbidding "the infliction of suffering, injury,
or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose."'1 0 In
other words, the Manual declares, humanity is "the logical inverse of the prin-
ciple of military necessity.""' But as previously noted, it omits the view found
in other modern law of war texts that the principle of humanity now incorpo-
rates earlier rules of chivalry.112
104. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 57, n.45 (quoting W. Hays Park, Executive Order 12333
and Assassination, in III CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1981-1988, at 3411, 3419 (1989)).
105. See Gabriela Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV.
NAT'L SECURITY J. 145, 146 (2010); Matthew Pollard, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Human
Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN SECURITY, AND STATE SECURITY: THE INTERSECTION 99, 112
(Saul Takahashi ed., 2014).
106. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 42.
107. Blum & Heymann, supra not 105, at 168.
108. Special Rapporteur on Extrajud., Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted
Killings, IM 40-41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston).
109. Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9) (stating that only attacks from foreign states can give
rise to the use of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
110. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 58.
111. Id. at 59.




The principle of proportionality is curiously treated next in the Manual.
Most law of war resources place distinction first as that principle establishes the
basic rule that combatants must distinguish between valid military objects of
attack and impermissible (normally civilian) ones, with proportionality essen-
tially a yardstick by which compliance with distinction is assessed. The propor-
tionality principle permits predictable civilian harm, termed "collateral dam-
age" in military parlance,l 3 so long as it is not disproportionate to the military
advantage expected from the attack. FM 27-10 expressed this concept six dec-
ades ago as "loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected
to be gained."ll 4 Modem formulations are typically based on paragraph 5(b) of
the 1977 Additional Protocol I's Article 51, which defines attacks "expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian ob-
jects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" as "indiscriminate," and
hence unlawful. 115
The Manual's initial treatment of proportionality and requirement (vel
non) to take specific precautions when planning and conducting attacks were
the sub ect of a substantial portion of the academic criticism it has received to
date. The DoD's December 2016 reissue focused on these issues, making
what it termed "[s]ubstantial revisions to the discussion of the principle of pro-
portionality" and necessary "conforming edits." In essence, the revisions:
(1) Acknowledge the responsibility to take feasible precautions to reduce
civilian collateral damage when planning and conducting attacks; a requirement
that the DoD considers to be derived from the proportionality principle." 8
(2) Clarify the U.S. view that while "feasible precautions must be taken to
reduce the risk of harm to military personnel and objects that are protected
from being made the object of attack" (e.g., medical facilities, the sick, and
wounded), the principle of proportionality per se applies only to the protection
of civilians and civilian objects and not to military ones.119
(3) Limit the responsibility of subordinates for making independent pro-
portionality determinations by justifying their reliance on decisions made by
higher level commanders, unless they know that the commander ordering the
attack knew themselves that it was unlawful, or the subordinate has been given
broad personal discretion with respect to its conduct.' 20
113. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND AssOCIATED
TERMS 35 (2016) [hereinafter JP 1-02].
114. FM 27-10, supra note 43, at 19.
115. See Additional Protocol 1, supra note 9, art. 51(4), (5)(b).
116. See, e.g., Haque, supra note 11.
117. Description of Changes Promulgated on December 13, 2016, attachment to Jennifer M.
O'Connor memorandum of Dec. 13, 2016, inserted in the unpaginated front matter of LOW MANUAL,
supra note 1, attachment at 1, 5.
118. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 249-50.
119. Id.at241-42.
120. Id. at 247.
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(4) Seek to bolster U.S. credibility by providing examples of situations in
which the DoD has exercised restraint in conducting attacks to prevent or min-
imize civilian harm. 12 1
Despite these obviously carefully crafted provisions, the revised Manual
still includes its own idiosyncratic and ambiguous definition of proportionality
"as the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a
way that is unreasonable or excessive." 1 22 It then conflates the jus in bello and
jus ad bellum once again by relying upon a supporting citation to an 1841 Dan-
iel Webster letter declaring that the permissible scope of an exercise of the right
of self defense must be limited by the scope of the necessity, even though that
is wholly distinct from the "military necessity" standard of the law of war.123
Even more bizarrely, the Manual declares proportionality to be "a legal re-
statement of the military concept of economy of force," implying that the rea-
son for not destroying more civilians is to preserve military capacity for strik-
ing more important targets, rather than reflecting law based on humanitarian
considerations. 124
These issues are relatively trivial, but the issues associated with the Man-
uals treatment of the principle of distinction-largely overlooked by critical
commentary to date-are not.
4. Distinction
The Manual's definition of "distinction" as requiring parties to a conflict
to distinguish "between the armed forces and the civilian population, and be-
tween unprotected and protected objects" is basically consistent with other
sources.125 What is truly problematic is the supporting analysis in subsequent
chapters of the Manual, which relies on overbroad definitions of military objec-
tive, and implicitly shifts a substantial compliance burden from the attacker on-
to the defender.
Virtually all modem sources accept the Additional Protocol I definition of
military objectives as objects "which by their nature, location, purpose, or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial de-
struction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, of-
fers a definite military advantage."1 26 The Manual adopts this terminology as
well, although citing only to the less widely ratified protocols to the U.N. Con-
vention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the U.S. Military Commissions
121. See, e.g., id. at 1247-48 nn.322-28, 250-52 nn.336-45, 253-54 nn.350-51.
122. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 60 n. 67
123. Id. This letter was part of the resolution of the Caroline incident involving issues of antici-
patory self-defense against a non-state actor across a national border. See, e.g., William K. Lietzau, Old
Laws, New Wars: Jus ad Bellum in an Age of Terrorism, MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS
LAW 383, 387-89 (2003); Le Van Den Hole, Anticipatory Self Defence Under International Law, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 69, 72 (2003).
124. JP 1-02, supra note 113, at 73 defines "economy of force" as "the judicious employ-
ment ... of forces so as to expend the minimum necessary combat power on secondary efforts in order
to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts."
125. See ICRC CIL Study, supra note 90, n.5
126. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 53(b).
[Vol. 42: 2234
Failing Our Troops
Actl27 rather than addressing more directly whether the Additional Protocol I
rule now constitutes CIL.
But it is the amplification of these terms in later sections of the Manual
that ultimately proves more troubling. For example, section 5.6.6.1 provides
expansive definitions of the terms "nature," "location," "purpose," and "use."
Every student of the law of war recognizes that an otherwise civilian object can
become a legitimate object of attack if put to actual military use; a church can
be attacked, for example, if its steeple is being used as a sniper post.128 But the
Manual goes much further, suggesting that under the "location" prong, a civil-
ian object located so that it "would provide a vantage pointfrom which attacks
could be launched or directed" might be attacked, without any explicit require-
ment that the enemy be actually making, or at least preparing to make, such
use.129 This definition seems to go much too far based on a reasonable reading
of the law, and will predictably lead to uses of force that will prove counterpro-
ductive to U.S. strategic interests. Military history (and medieval architecture)
buffs will recall the devastating U.S. World War II bombing of the sixth centu-
ry Abbey of Monte Cassino motivated by fear that the Germans might use it as
a military observation post. The perverse irony was that the Germans only en-
tered it after the U.S.-wrought destruction made its ruins an excellent defensive
position, and were then able to inflict huge losses on attacking Allied forces. 130
Similarly, the Manual seems to stretch "purpose" too far. Purpose must
logically mean something other than "use," or it would be redundant for
sources such as Article 51 of Additional Protocol I to use both terms succes-
sively. Both the Australian and U.K. Manuals differentiate these terms, declar-
ing: "Purpose means the future intended use of an object while 'use' means its
present function."' 3 1 The DoD volume cites these Australian and U.K. counter-
parts, but then dramatically expands this notion from "intended" to include the
much more speculative "possible use in the future."' 32 This critical distinction
effectively guts the rule of its restraining value. The Manual uses the example
of civilian airport runways, as these could be "subject to immediate military use
in the event that runways at military air bases have been rendered unserviceable
or inoperable."' 33 By not requiring any evidence of intent to make such use,
this example makes every civil airport capable of accommodating a military
aircraft a legitimate object of attack at the outbreak of hostilities. Striking air-
port runways may not seem terribly problematic, but since almost any object
could be described as having some possible future military use, very little-if
anything-would be "off limits" to attack under the Manual's approach.
The Manual also adopts an exceptionally broad interpretation of Addi-
tional Protocol I's requirement that the object "make an effective contribution
127. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 210-12 nn.150, 157, 162.
128. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 93-94.
129. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 213 (emphasis added).
130. SOLIS, supra note 2, at 261-62.
131. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 213 n.170 (quoting the 2004 U.K. MANUAL and 2006
Australian counterpart).
132. Id.at213.
133. Id. at 209.
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to military action,"l 34 declaring that contributions might be "effective, but re-
mote" and that "effective contribution to the . . . war-sustaining capability of an
opposing force is sufficient."' 35 This assertion was previously found in the Na-
vy's handbook, although categorically rejected as "untenable" by distinguished
Israeli scholar Yoram Dinstein,136 who ironically has twice held the U.S. Naval
War College's rotating Charles H. Stockton Chair in International Law. 17 The
Manual's sources for this proposition are just a book chapter by Hays Parks and
an Air Force legal journal article by retired Navy Judge Advocate General Hor-
ace B. Robertson. 138 It also states (without supporting authority) that civil air-
craft lose their immunity from attack when incorporated "into the enemy's war-
fighting or war sustaining effort." 1 39 Given the extensive reliance by the mili-
tary on U.S. commercial airlines for personnel movement, the participation of
major domestic airlines in the DoD's Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, 140 and
the role of civil aviation in facilitating overall U.S. economic activity, the Man-
ual provides a strong argument for the legality of targeting almost any U.S.
commercial aircraft.
The same definition of military objective is included in the Military
Commissions Act governing the Guantinamo tribunals.141 Coupled with the
Manual's treatment of civil aircraft, this opens the door for the accused 9/11
conspirators to argue that the economic significance of the World Trade Center
made it, and the four airliners destroyed, lawful "war-sustaining" targets, and
the nearly 3,000 civilian deaths just "collateral damage." Since the estimated
losses due to 9/11 came to $178 billion, and the total cost, including the mili-
tary response, has reached $3.3 trillion,142 the Manual's approach would seem
to make this a colorable military commission defense.
The Manual further endeavors to largely shift the burden to avoid civilian
harm to the defender, declaring, with no support other than unilateral U.S. pro-
nouncements, that "[t]he party controlling civilians and civilian objects has the
primary responsibility for the[ir] protection."l43 Additional Protocol I Article
57 requires that an attacker "[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to min-
imizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civil-
ian objects."'" A footnote indicates that the United States has accepted the
134. Additional Protocol, supra note 9, art. 52, ¶2.
135. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 213-14 (emphasis added).
136. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 95.
137. See History of the Charles H. Stockon Chair, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
https://www.usnwc.edu.edulDepartments-Colleges/Intemational-Law/Stockton-Chair/Charles-H-
Stockton-Chair.aspx.
138. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 214 n.175.
139. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 937.
140. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Civil Reserve Air Fleet, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (June 1, 2016),
www.amc.af.mil/ library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=234.
141. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 214 n.174 (citing to the definition of military objective
found in the Military Commissions Act, currently codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950p(a)(1) (2012)).
142. Shan Carter & Amanda Cox, One 9/11 Tally: $3.3 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011),
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html.
143. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 187.
144. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 57, 1 2(a)(ii).
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principle that "all practicable precautions, taking into account military and hu-
manitarian considerations, be taken . . . to minimize incidental [harm]." 45 But
the text asserts that attackers can consider such factors as impact on their own
mission accomplishment, risk to their own forces, and costs of taking precau-
tions,146 before concluding that "a commander may determine that a precaution
would not be feasible because it would result in operational risk (i.e., a risk of
failing to accomplish the mission) or an increased risk of harm to his or her
forces," then the precaution would not be feasible and would not be required.1 47
This will have the practical effect of allowing U.S. commanders to regularly
decide that precautions are unnecessary, since any significant measure to pro-
tect civilians is likely to require acceptance of some increased risk of mission
failure or harm to friendly forces.
Protections accorded to civilians are further weakened by the Manual's
low standards concerning the effort commanders must make to acquire infor-
mation about their target. Although modem capabilities, such as reconnaissance
drones, now offer unprecedented pre-strike observation capabilities, the Manual
declares in a section unchanged by the most recent revision that "the im-
portance of prevailing during armed conflict often justifies taking actions based
upon limited information that would be considered unreasonable outside armed
conflict."l48 In making this assertion, the Manual only cites Justice Jackson's
dissent in the Korematsu decision upholding Japanese-American internment.149
This approach has the unfortunate consequence of easily justifying such actions
as the Ukrainian separatists' inadvertent downing of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH 17.
The Manual rejects Additional Protocol I's requirement that in case of
doubt, objects be treated as having civilian status, asserting instead that "no le-
gal presumption of civilian status exists for persons or objects" under CIL. 15o
(Curiously, although it referenced the DoD Manual, the U.S. military investiga-
tion into the accidental October 2015 airstrike on Medicins Sans Frontieres'
hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan faulted the participants for failing to accord it
presumed civilian status.) 151 The Manual's text merely requires commanders to
act in "good faith" based on "information available to them at the time."' 52 The
critical legal requirement that commanders make use of information "reasona-
bly available," rather than just whatever they might have immediately at hand
or selectively elect to consult, is buried in the footnotes.1 53 This is particularly
troubling since the Manual pronounces that it is unnecessary to read its foot-
145. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 190 n.35.
146. Id. at 193.
147. Id. at 193-94.
148. Id. at 196.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 200.
151. GEN. JOHN F. CAMPBELL, U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN, INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE
AIRSTRIKE ON THE MEDECINS SANS FRONTIEIRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS TRAUMA CENTER IN
KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON 3 OCTOBER 2015, at 59 (2015), http://fpp.cc/wp-content/uploads/01.-AR-
15-6-Inv-Rpt-Doctors-Without-Borders-3-Oct- 15_CLEAR.pdf
152. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 196.
153. Id. at 196 nn.66-67.
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notes to understand the law. 154 It will thus predictably be overlooked by most
readers, who will likely note only the lesser requirement in the body of the text
that attacks "may not be directed against civilians or civilian objects based on
merely hypothetical or speculative considerations."' 55
In keeping with the effort to shift responsibility for collateral damage to
the defender, the Manual gives attackers a potential free pass for unintended
destruction of military medical units or facilities, proclaiming that "incidental
harm to medical units or facilities, due to their ... proximity to combatant ele-
ments . .. gives no just cause for complaint."l 56 The only external support of-
fered for this proposition is a Vietnam-era military writer's claim that a North
Vietnamese hospital damaged by U.S. airstrikes was sited near lawful targets
including a military airfield and air defense command center.157 Probably as a
result of both academic criticism and the negative fallout associated with the
U.S. strike on the Medicin Sans Frontiers hospital four months after the Manu-
al's publication, as well as the more recent furor over damage to hospitals in
Syria,158 the December 2016 revision clarified that this language applied only
to "military" medical facilities and, as previously noted, does now at least call
for "feasible precautions" to be taken. 159
5. Honor
The concept of honor, also called chivalry, originated in the Middle Ages.
It was recognized as a fundamental principle in various law of war sources
through the mid-twentieth century, including the 1863 decision in the Prize
Cases, 1o the United States', and United Kingdom's 1914 Law of War Manu-
als, 161 Lauterpacht and Oppenheim's 1952 International Law Treatise,
1 62 and
the 1956 edition of the U.S. Army's Field Manual 27-10,163 by which time the
concept was clearly waning. Most nations no longer recognize this as a funda-
mental principle. While the 1958 U.K. Manual did so, the 2004 iteration now
states that the principle of humanity "incorporates the earlier rules of chival-
ry.,16 The 2001 Canadian Law of War Manual identifies chivalry as a "prima-
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id.at201.
156. Id. at 467-68.
157. Id. at 468 n.239 (quoting Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Military Writer Charges: Reds Dupe
Doves on Hanoi Hospital, THE PITrSBURGH PRESS, Jan. 10, 1973).
158. See, e.g., Doctors Without Borders Calls Deadly Hospital Attack in Syria 'Deliberate',
ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2016), www.abcnews.go.com/intemational/doctors-borders-calls-deadly-hospital-
attack-syria-deliberate/story?id=36952507.
159. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, List of Changes, p. 6 of 9 (identifying change to §
7.10.1.1).
160. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635, 667 (1863).
161. WAR DEP'T, supra note 41 at 13; UNITED KINGDOM WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY
LAW 284 (1914) (declaring corporal punishment "and cruelty in any form" as impermissible punish-
ments for war crimes).
162. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 79 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
163. WAR DEP'T, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: RULES OF LAND
WARFARE (1940).
164. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 23-24.
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ry concept," but not as a fundamental or operational principle.' 65 It notes that
the concept is "reflected in specific prohibitions such as those against dishon-
ourable or treacherous conduct and against misuse of enemy flags or flags of
truce."' 66
Affirming this contemporary view, the Australian Law Of Armed Con-
flict Manual states, "[t]raditionally, chivalry has been included in the list of
principles but this is now classified as an element of the principle of unneces-
sary suffering [humanity] and is not treated as a separate topic."' 67
It is problematic for the United States to identify an outmoded conception
of honor (or chivalry, with its chauvinistic legacy) as a fundamental principle
today.1 68 The Manual acknowledges "[h]onor demands a certain amount of
fairness in offense and defense and a certain mutual respect between opposing
forces." 69 But with the U.S. reliance on cutting-edge technology and remotely
operated weapons, it cannot be considered to be on an equal footing with its
enemies, as the principle of honor would require. Indeed, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recently told Congress that U.S. personnel should never be
sent into a "fair fight."o7 0 U.S. drone use is widely viewed as cowardly in the
Muslim world. Handing our adversaries the opportunity to quote the DoD's
own Manual against itself is thus particularly shortsighted.
Nor, as the next Section will discuss, does the United States treat current
adversaries as legal equivalents meriting mutual respect. Instead, the Manual
endeavors to manipulate the concept of "honor" to brand them as "unprivileged
belligerents" outside traditional legal protections by claiming "[lawful] com-
batants are a common class of professionals who have undertaken to comport
themselves honorably." 72
B. Unprivileged Belligerents
Virtually all law of war sources recognize the existence of "combatants"
and "civilians" as distinct legal categories, with separate rules as to when, and
under what conditions, members of each group may be targeted or detained.
The United States, however, controversially asserts the additional existence of a
third category, which the Manual terms "unprivileged belligerents," 73 to justi-
165. DEP'T NAT'L DEF., JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS 2-1 (Aug. 13, 2001) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Manual].
166. Id.
167. AUSTL. DEF. FORCE, AUSTRALIAN DEF. DOCTRINE PUBL'N 06.4, LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 2-2 (May 11, 2006) [hereinafter Australian Manual].
168. See, e.g., Rachel VanLandingham, The Law of War is Not About "Chivalry," JUST
SECURITY, (July 20, 2015, 9:13 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/24773/laws-war-chivalry/. A minor
change in the 2016 update now seeks to distinguish honor from chivalry, perhaps in response to Profes-
sor VanLandingham's critique. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 66.
169. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 65-66.
170. Jim Garamone, U.S. Troops Should Not Be Sent Into Fair Fights, Dunford Says, DOD
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/744390/ no- fair-fights-for-
us-troops-chairman-says.
171. See, e.g., McManus, supra note 15 (quoting counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen).
172. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 69.
173. See id. at 101-05, 160-64.
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fy the targeting and detention of adversaries in its so-called "war on terror,"
while denying them the traditional protections accorded to either POWs or ci-
vilians preventively detained as security threats. (Since 9/11, these individuals
have also been variously described by U.S. Government sources as "detainees,"
"enemy combatants," and "unlawful enemy combatants."1 74)
Combatants are legally recognized as authorized participants in hostili-
ties. Since core combat functions-the deliberate killing or wounding of other
human beings and the destruction of material objects-are crimes in every do-
mestic legal system, it is necessary to exempt combatants from ordinary crimi-
nal law in order to legalize their participation in hostilities. To keep this con-
duct from being wholly lawless, it must instead be judged under the law of
war. 175 This "belligerent immunity" from domestic law is granted by interna-
tional law, but comes at a cost. Combatants receiving the privilege are them-
selves lawfully targetable at essentially any time or place, and may be preven-
tively detained as "prisoners of war" for the duration of hostilities, subject to
176
specific legal protections. 6 Although not perfectly congruent, a combatant's
exemption from domestic law and eligibility for treatment as a POW essentially
go hand-in-hand. As a result, qualification for "POW status" is commonly used
as a shorthand expression for entitlement to belligerent immunity.1 7 7
Civilians, in contrast, have no legal immunity from the operation of do-
mestic law when they participate in hostilities, but are concurrently protected
from deliberate attack so long as they do not actively join in the conflict. If a
civilian directly participates in hostilities, she forfeits this protection and may
be targeted for the duration of her participation.178 Because civilians lack bel-
ligerent immunity, they can also be prosecuted for any acts of violence they
commit under ordinary domestic law. Additionally, they may be preventively
detained or interned if determined to present a significant security threat, but
unlike the combatant, who is subject to blanket detention for the duration of
hostilities, the civilian detainee's status as a continuing threat must be reviewed
on at least a semiannual basis.179
In the Manual's view, unprivileged belligerents are a separate third cate-
gory, comprising individuals who "lack the privileges" but are "subject to the
liabilities" of both combatant and civilian status simultaneously. 180 The Manual
concedes that the "unprivileged belligerent" is "seldom explicitly recognized as
a class in law of war treaties." 18 ' The reality is that such a distinct category has
never been explicitly recognized with respect to either targeting or non-punitive
preventive detention; the term has traditionally just been used to identify partic-
ipants in hostilities who are denied belligerent immunity and may thus be crim-
inally tried for any violent acts they perpetrate, as well as privileged belliger-
174. SOLIS, supra note 2, at 224.
175. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 37.
176. SOLIS, supra note 2, at 190.
177. See, e.g., LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 108.
178. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 146.
179. Id. at 147.
180. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 160-64.
181. Id. at 102-03.
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ents who violate the law of war. The Manual notes the distinct ways military
and civilian persons become unprivileged belligerents, as the category is said to
include both (1) lawful combatants who lost their privilege by "engaging in
spying, sabotage, and similar acts behind enemy lines," and (2) "private per-
sons engaging in hostilities" who never had lawful combatant status.' 82
1. The Military Spy, Saboteur, or Combatant Failing to
Distinguish Himself
Spying is defined by the law of war that authorizes punishment under
domestic law as a deterrent for the victim state's self-protection, but does not
criminalize the practice under international law per se. 183 (Commentators typi-
cally agree that military saboteurs out of uniform behind enemy lines are liable
for the same treatment as spies. 84) Because the cloak of belligerent immunity
must be removed from these individuals to permit their domestic prosecution,
they are frequently described as losing the right to "POW status.", They are
not bereft of protections under international law, however. Summary punish-
ment of spies without trial was prohibited by the Hague Land Warfare Regula-
tions in 1899.186 Since the conclusion of Additional Protocol I, these individu-
als are now protected at a minimum by the extensive fair trial guarantees of its
Article 75.1 87 While the military spy is unique in being subject to trial outside
the specific legal regime established for POWs, this is not a true third category
in that there is no separate targeting or detention regime for spies. If not im-
prisoned (or executed) pursuant to a criminal sentence imposed after a trial
meeting Article 75 standards, the military spy logically defaults back to POW
status.
Similarly, Article 44 of Additional Protocol I says that a combatant cap-
tured during an attack or pre-attack deployment while failing to distinguish
himself by carrying arms openly "forfeit[s] his right to be a prisoner of war,"
yet the treaty mandates that he receives protections fully equivalent to those
"accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention [GPW] and by this Pro-
tocol."1 8 8 In other words, the only practical difference in treatment between
these individuals and an actual POW is that combatants failing to distinguish
themselves lose belligerent immunity and can be tried under applicable domes-
tic law for their actions.
182. Id. at 101.
183. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 46; 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note
40, arts. 29-31, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 45-
47.
184. See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 2, at 223; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 46 (noting that
"earlier rules which, which equated saboteurs with spies, have been superseded," but then states at 63
that sabotage attacks behind enemy lines are only lawful if, inter alia, "carried out by combatants who
distinguish themselves from the civilian population"). Unfortunately the DoD Manual's assertion to this
end is supported only by sources addressing spying, not sabotage. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at
152, n.353.
185. See, e.g., Additional Protocol 1, supra note 9, art. 46, ¶ 1.
186. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 40, arts. 29-30.
187. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 75.
188. Id.atart.44,¶4.
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2. Civilian Spies, Saboteurs, and Irregular Combatants
The issue is simpler with respect to civilians. Because they receive no
immunity with the single (and exceptionally rare) exception of a levie en
masse-essentially a large-scale call to arms or popular uprising against an in-
vading army 89-any other civilian participation in hostilities, including spying
or sabotage, is liable to domestic prosecution. Unlike the military spy, the civil-
ian thus does not need to be exempted from the ordinary rules governing
his/her class. The Fourth Geneva Convention protecting civilians permits only
a minor derogation; in territory under military occupation, the "rights of com-
munication" can be temporarily suspended for those detained for spying, sabo-
tage, or "suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Pow-
er."1 90 The ICRC Commentary notes that the right to delay announcing such
captures could be important in facilitating "capturing a whole organization or
spy ring."1 91 Aside from this single derogation, however, civilian "spies, sabo-
teurs, or irregular combatants" remain protected by the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. 192
The targeting of civilians falling into these categories is governed by the
"direct participation in hostilities standard," while criteria for their non-punitive
preventive detention are addressed by specific provisions in the Fourth Geneva
Convention.1 93 Alternatively, they can be punitively incarcerated following a
trial meeting the international standards set forth in Articles 66-77 of the Fourth
General Convention 94 or Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1.195
3. A Third Category?
The Manual's claim of the existence of "unprivileged belligerent" as a
distinct third category is thus highly problematic given the comprehensive
scope of law of war rules applicable to combatants and civilians. It seems con-
ceptually rooted in the use of the similar term "unlawful combatant" in the
1942 Supreme Court decision Ex parte Quirin, 196 in reference to eight state-
sponsored combatants who had removed issued uniform items after landing in
the United States in order to blend in with the civilian population. 197 But ulti-
189. See, e.g., U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 38, 45.
190. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 42, art. 5.
191. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 53 (1958).
192. Id.
193. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 42, arts. 42-43 (addressing internment of aliens
in the territory of a conflict party when "absolutely necessary" for that state's security); id art. 78 (al-
lowing internment in occupied territory "for imperative reasons of security").
194. Id. arts. 66-77.
195. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 9, art. 75.
196. 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see, e.g., LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 102-05, 102 n.29, 103 n.35.
197. The defendants "had received instructions in Germany from an officer of the German High
Command to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States, for which they or their rela-




mately Quirin just held that they could be tried for this conduct, saying nothing
about them constituting a separate category in any other respect.
The Manual argues, however, that the "unprivileged belligerent" classifi-
cation follows as an "implicit consequence of creating the classes of lawful
combatants and peaceful civilians," 98 although neither of these modifiers are
used with "combatants" or "civilians" in the Third or Fourth Geneva Conven-
tions, and, as noted previously, protections found in both agreements extend to
those who engage in spying, sabotage, or other unprivileged acts. Although it
cites to other sections of the Fourth Geneva Convention commentary with ap-
parent approval, the Manual omits its clear assertion that there is "no interme-
diate status" between POW and civilian. 199 For sixty years, the Army's official
legal manual has endorsed this same view, declaring in a section captioned
"Persons Committing Hostile Acts Not Entitled To Be Treated as Prisoners of
War" that such individuals are still protected persons under the Fourth Geneva
Convention.200 This position was reinforced by Additional Protocol I Article
50, which provides for a broad interpretation of "civilian" as anyone not meet-
ing the legal criteria for combatant status. 20 1
The Manual also ignores the views of other states dealing with this issue.
It does not address, for example, the Israeli High Court of Justice's specific
consideration and explicit rejection of the arguments in favor of a distinct third
202
category, holding instead that "an unlawful combatant is not a combatant,
but a 'civilian."' 203 Nor does it acknowledge the Council of Europe's pro-
nouncement that those not qualifying for POW status are "protected persons"
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, including specifically "illegal combat-
,,204
ants. Nor does it acknowledge that the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also found that those not falling into POW pro-
tection "necessarily fall[] within the ambit" of that treaty, provided that its na-
tionality requirements are met.205
4. Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities
The congressionally endorsed decision to treat 9/11 as an act of war and
206
employ military force against al Qaeda and the Taliban, coupled with the
subsequent presidential determination denying members of these groups status
198. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 103.
199. UHLER ET AL., supra note 191, at 51.
200. FM 27-10, supra note 43, at 31.
201. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 50, 1 1.
202. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov't Israel 459, 489 (2006) (Isr.).
203. Id. at para. 26.
204. "Suspected members of an international terrorist network, such as al Qaeda, who are na-
tionals of a party to such a conflict, fall into the category of other 'protected persons' under GC IV,
though they usually do not qualify for POW status. . . ." Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through L.,
Opinion on the Possible Need for Further Development of the Geneva Conventions, N 84, CDL-AD
(2003) 18 (Dec. 17, 2003); see also id. at 1 68 (noting that "illegal combatants" are protected under the
Fourth Geneva Convention).
205. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 271 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
206. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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as privileged combatants,207 necessitates justifying the targeting under another
categorization. The most credible approach would be to rely upon the univer-
sally recognized category of civilians who become liable to attack when they
take an "active" or "direct part in hostilities." 208 As the Manual notes, "[fjor the
purpose of applying the rule . . . 'civilians' are persons who do not fall within
the categories of combatan[t] . . . ."209
Following a multiyear series of expert meetings, the ICRC published a
ten-chapter volume in 2009 on how it recommends the Additional Protocol I
language on direct participation be interpreted.210 Overall, the interpretive
guidance concedes to states the latitude to treat full-time members of non-state
groups-those having what it terms a "continuous combat function"-as being
continuously liable to targeting. 211 The United States, and some experts in-
volved in the development, take legitimate issue with Chapter IX's assertion of
an obligation to use the least amount of force necessary to achieve military ob-
212jectives-i.e., endeavoring to capture, wound, or kill in that order. Neverthe-
less, given the ICRC's respected stature and humanitarian focus, the U.S. could
gain valuable political top cover if it adopted, and cited to, those provisions in
the guidance that are in general accord with its views. The Manual's specific
discussion of "Taking a Direct Part in Hostilities," for example, is generally
consistent with the ICRC guidance. 213
Instead the Manual takes a different tack, effectively doubling down on
its claims-despite the general lack of credible international legal support- as
to the existence of unprivileged belligerents as a discrete third category. It con-
tains several assertions to this end, unsupported by citation to external authori-
ty,214 before ultimately conceding that "[e]ither approach may yield the same
result: members of hostile, non-state armed groups may be made the object of
attack unless they are placed hors de combat."215 The Manual gives examples
of a range of conduct that it considers to qualify as "direct participation," in-
cluding "planning, authorizing, or implementing a combat operation," "acting
as a member of a weapons crew," "emplacing mines or improvised explosive
devices,". "providing or relaying information of immediate use in combat op-
erations," or "supplying weapons and ammunition ... or assembling weapons
... in close geographic or temporal proximity to their use." 216
207. Bash, infra note 344.
208. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 226.
209. Id. at 227.
210. NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(2009).
211. Id. at 70-73.
212. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC Direct Participation in Hostilities Study: No
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 (2010); LOW
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 56-57.
213. Compare LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 226-36, with MELZER, supra note 210.
214. See, e.g., LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 102, 160-61.
215. Id. at 228.
216. Id. at 231-32.
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Regardless of whether one accepts the Manual's conception of classifying
its adversaries in the post-9/1 1 "War on Terror" as unprivileged belligerents or
as civilians directly participating in hostilities, it still creates the unprecedented
situation of a wholly one-sided transnational conflict in which the United States
asserts the right to kill its adversaries but holds everyone on the opposing side
to be criminals if they shoot in turn. This is not armed conflict-and certainly
not one implicating any principle of "honor"-but a human hunting season. In
previous conflicts of this nature dating back to the mid-eighteenth century (that
is, concurrent with the initial development of the contemporary law of war), the
United States consistently recognized the legal right of its adversaries to partic-
ipate in hostilities against it as the cost of asserting belligerent rights itself.217
5. The Problem of Unprivileged U.S. Belligerents
The Manual's hard line with respect to unprivileged belligerency also
risks hoisting the U.S. Government on its own petard thanks to post-9/11 U.S.
conduct. The significant expansion of U.S. civilian participation in conflict,
from CIA drone strikes to the extensive use of contractors in traditional military
roles, is legally dubious.218 So, too, is the use of CIA paramilitary, and even
U.S. special forces personnel, fighting out of uniform. Although not war crimes
per se, these activities logically cost military personnel their belligerent immun-
ity, thus subjecting them-along with their civilian counterparts-to ordinary
criminal liability for any acts of violence they participate in.
Although the Manual declares that "only military aircraft are entitled to
engage in attacks in armed conflict" 2 ' 9-itself sufficient to place lethal em-
ployment of CIA-owned and operated drones outside of international law-
virtually all other respected law of war sources, including those cited by the
Manual, take a broader view. A more typical formulation is that attributed to
the equivalent German law of war manual, which states that "[o]nly military
aircraft are entitled to exercise belligerent rights." 220 Transmission of "intelli-
gence for the immediate use of a belligerent" has been considered to be partici-
pation in hostilities since the 1923 Draft Hague Rules of Air Warfare 21 and
falls within the Manual's own definition of "direct participation in hostili-
ties."222 CIA drone flights providing real-time feeds to the military are thus
217. David Glazier, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of the Military Com-
mission Charges Against Omar Khadr 9-18 (Loyola Law Sch. L.A. Legal Studies Working Paper No.
37, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstract-1669946; see also ROGER Di SILVESTRO, IN THE SHADOW OF
WOUNDED KNEE 180-94 (2005) (documenting the acquittal of Plenty Horses for killing Lieutenant Ed-
ward Casey, the last Indian War fatality, because he was a participant in an armed conflict).
218. See, e.g., William Cole, Pilot Error Cited in Fatal Afghanistan Crash, HONOLULU STAR-
ADVERTISER (Feb. 28 2016), http://www.staradvertiser.com/2016/02/28/hawaii-news/pilot-error-cited-
in-afghanistan-crash.
219. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 910 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 910 n.63.
221. See General Report ofthe Commission ofJurists at the Hague, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 245
(1923) (containing the 1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, art. 16 [hereinafter Hague Draft
Rules]).
222. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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problematic even when missiles are not fired, as is letting civilians pilot tactical
signals-intelligence flights.
The Manual deals with this fact in a unique, but ultimately unpersuasive,
way, articulating an incomplete, and state-centric view of what constitutes priv-
ileged belligerency. Its discussion of privileged belligerency omits the primary
source for this status, Article 1 of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations, which
proclaims:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3) To carry arms openly; and
4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.223
Although acknowledging that combatants must distinguish themselves
from civilians, 224 the Manual does so based only on a citation to a comparative-
ly obscure 1976 treatise on POWs by a Finnish jurist.225 It fails to emphasize
the need for formal command, a distinctive emblem, open carriage of arms, or
organization to receive privileged status, other than identifying these as re-
quirements for "militia and volunteer corps." 226 Instead, other than the levie en
masse, the Manual would effectively just hinge a combatant's lawfulness on
membership in an armed group belonging to a state.227 Making state-affiliation
the lynchpin for lawful combatant status cleverly avoids capturing recent U.S.
conduct, such as special-operations personnel fighting out of uniform, and ex-
tensive use of military contractors or civilian personnel accompanying armed
forces, while simultaneously undercutting any claim to legitimacy on the part
of non-state adversaries.
According to the Manual, U.S. special-operations personnel do not lose
their lawful status if they doff their uniforms to look like "friendly forces,"
since they are not doing so to blend with civilians, and thus are not "acting
clandestinely or under false pretenses." 228 And it claims that non-military per-
sonnel of the state who "support military operations" are protected from attack,
as non-combatants are, yet entitled to legal immunity and "POW status" as
privileged belligerents would be. 229 The Manual supports its assertion of legal
immunity, however, only by citation to commentary that identifies this view as
"U.S. practice." 230
In marked contrast, the Manual proclaims that a civilian providing analo-
gous support to a non-state entity engaged in hostilities against a state is con-
223. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 40, art. 1.
224. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 106.
225. Id. at 206 n.122 (citing a 1976 text by Allan Rosas).
226. Id. at 206.
227. Id. at 104.
228. Id. at 113 (referring to § 5.25.2.1 "Mimicking Other Friendly Forces," citing W. Hays
Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniform, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493, 554 (2003)).
229. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 141-47.
230. Id. at 146 n.318.
[Vol. 42: 2246
Failing Our Troops
structively part of the non-state group and subject to treatment "in one or more
respects as an unprivileged belligerent," even if not formally a member.231
The Manual's justification for its assertion that an armed group is only
lawful when it belongs to a state is too clever by half, requiring two separate
acts of conflation. First, it confuses the philosophical just war doctrine, which
establishes a set of criteria for the moral legitimacy of armed conflict, including
that decisions to use force be made only by lawful government officials-
known as "right authority"-with the actual intemational legal rules governing
the use of the force, or jus ad bellum.232 But as Yoram Dinstein explains in his
jus ad bellum text:
In the nineteenth (and early part of the twentieth) century, the attempt to differenti-
ate between just and unjust wars in positive international law was discredited and
abandoned. States continued to use the rhetoric of justice when they went to war,
but the justification produced no legal reverberations. Most international lawyers
conceded openly that '[w]ith the inherent rightfulness of war international law has
nothing to do.' Or, in the acerbic words of T. J. Lawrence, distinctions between just
and unjust causes of war 'belong to morality and theology, and are as much out of
place in a treatise on International Law as would be a discussion on the ethics of
marriage in a book on the law of personal status.' 2 33
But even if "right authority" was a recognized component of the jus ad
bellum, the Manual would still repeat its previous mistake of conflating that
body of law with the jus in bello. Categorically excluding non-state actors from
the law of war would be contrary to historical U.S. practice 234 and undermine
the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules in order to encourage
compliance with the latter by those in violation of the former. Although the
United States objects to this provision, the fact that both the UN General As-
sembly,235 and the 174 states which have ratified Additional Protocol I, recog-
nize "national liberation movements" as legitimate participants in international
armed conflict proves that the international community does not mandate state
status as being requisite for lawful participation in hostilities.
C. Weapons
The Manual contains a number of controversial assertions about the inter-
national rules regulating weapons. This Section addresses three issues repre-
sentative of these concerns: (1) the claim of a U.S. military right to use expand-
ing bullets;236 (2) the permissibility of using bayonets with serrated edges; and,
(3) U.S. legal obligations when employing cluster munitions.
231. Id. at 158.
232. See id. at 40.
233. DINSTEIN, supra note 76, at 69.
234. See, e.g., David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of
War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 989-90 (2009).
235. G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973).
236. See generally Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8.2(b)(xix), opened for sig-
nature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (outlawing "bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the
core or is pierced with incisions").
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1. Expanding Bullets
The Manual makes the astonishing claim that "[t]he law of war does not
prohibit the use of bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body. Like
other weapons, such bullets are only prohibited if they are calculated to cause
superfluous injury." 237 This assertion has three fundamental flaws:
(1) it flies in the face of a widely recognized CIL prohibition of these bul-
lets, and the explicit codification of their employment as a war crime in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC);
(2) it misrepresents the actual CIL rule governing superfluous injury; and,
(3) it inverts the concept of lex specialis by calling for compliance with a
general rule against superfluous injury in the face of a specific rule banning this
weapon.
a. Customary International Law Prohibits the Use of
Expanding Bullets
Expanding bullets were addressed at the first Hague peace conference in
1899 following their development by the British at their Dum-Dum arsenal in
India to "stop the impetuous charges of certain Afghan warriors." 238 They are
thus colloquially known as "dum-dum bullets." Other nations considered the
harm they inflicted to be excessive, however, and the resulting Declaration on
Expanding Bullets required parties to "abstain from the use of bullets which
expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard enve-
lope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions." 239 The
Declaration's prefatory language acknowledged inspiration by the 1868 St. Pe-
tersburg Declaration240 which proclaimed "the employment of arms which use-
lessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable
... contrary to the laws of humanity." 241 But the 1899 ban is based on the
physical characteristic of ready deformation in the human body, not on causing
superfluous wounds. Indeed, the United States objected to the text specifically
for that reason, arguing for a more inclusive ban based on the nature of the
wound inflicted rather than the physical characteristics of the bullet.242 Britain
objected to the Declaration because it wanted to continue using these particular
bullets, but the U.S. objection was based on the idea that the ban did not go far
enough. Army Judge Advocate General George B. Davis explained that by bas-
ing the ban on "mechanical construction ... [o]ther forms of bullet, of which
there are a great number, some of which inflict wounds that exceed in cruelty
237. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 347.
238. Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, the Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons,
18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 705, 718 (1996).
239. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets,
July 29, 1899, 187 Consul. T.S. 459.
240. Id.
241. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 34.




those described in the convention, do not fall within the scope of the prohibi-
tion and ... may be employed with impunity." 243
But as Adam Roberts notes, "the objections of both Great Britain and the
United States were overruled and the Declaration was adopted." 244 Britain soon
had a change of heart, ratifying it in response to political pressures in 1907, de-
spite the British Army's continued arguments about the military necessity of
the greater stopping power of an expanding bullet.245
Although the Declaration only attracted twenty parties,246 its core rule has
241subsequently received virtually universal recognition as CIL. The ICRC's
CIL study documented widespread state support for this view, identifying the
prohibition as applicable to both international and non-international armed con-
flict. 24 8 The U.K. Manual notes that "the Declaration should be regarded as re-
flecting customary international law and binding on all states and individual
combatants."249 Denmark sent three soldiers found with hollow point (expand-
ing) bullets in their pistols home from Afghanistan to face trial, and potential
life sentences, under its military penal code.250 Leading U.S. commentators also
agree that the ban is binding CIL.251
Moreover, use of expanding bullets is specifically defined, in the Declara-
tion's language, as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the ICC. This provi-
sion was included in the original treaty for international armed conflict.252 The
United States participated in those negotiations and reportedly voiced no objec-
213tion. A subsequent amendment adopted by the 2010 Kampala review confer-
ence extends the rule to non-international armed conflicts.254 The Rome Stat-
ute's ban is a specific prohibition; the following paragraph generically bans
"weapons ... of a nature to cause superfluous injury."255 The Rome delegates
had difficulty in agreeing on what other weapons were specifically banned, so
243. George B. Davis, Amerlioration of the Rules of War on Land, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 75
(1908).
244. Id.
245. See Edward M. Spiers, The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet in Colonial Warfare, 4 J.
IMPERIAL & COMMONWEALTH HIST. 3 (1975).
246. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, St. Petersburg., Dec. 1868, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsflStates.xsp?
xp-viewStates=XPages.NORMStates Parties&xp-treatySelected= 170.
247. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHMITT, CHARLES GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 35 (2006) ("[Tlhere is
no doubt that the prohibition represents customary international law in international armed conflicts ...
248. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 90, Rule 77.
249. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 109 n.32.
250. Afghanistan: Soldiers Accused of Using 'Dum-Dum' Bullets, GLOBAL RES. (Sept. 30,
2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/afghanistan-soldiers-accused-of-using-dum-dum-bullets/1 5490.
The soldiers were ultimately only fined because there was no evidence that they had actually fired any
of these rounds. Email from Helene Hajfeldt, PhD Fellow, Aarhus Univ. Dep't of Law, to author (May
29, 2016) (on file with author).
251. See SCHMITT, supra note 247 (reflecting the views of Michael Schmitt); SOLIS, supra note
2, at 55.
252. Rome Statute, supra note 236, art. 8(2)(b)(xix).
253. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 90, Rule 77.
254. Rome Statute, supra note 236, art. 8(2)(e)(xv).
255. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
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they deferred the issue by providing that the ICC cannot prosecute anyone for
using a weapon causing superfluous injury until it is identified in a treaty annex
via the Statute's formal amendment process.256 But states had no similar reser-
vations about prohibiting expanding bullets in the treaty body along with bans
on poison and asphyxiating gas.257
The DoD Manual stresses that the "interpretation and application" of
crimes set forth in the Rome Statute are supported by a separate "Elements of
Crimes," 258 which "explain that this rule is not violated unless, inter alia, '[tlhe
perpetrator was aware that the nature of the bullets was such that their em-
ployment would uselessly aggravate suffering or the wounding effect."' 259 (The
Manual's quotation of this language is ironic since it demonstrates the clear in-
ternational consensus that the "nature" of a weapon is dispositive, rather than
its "calculated" or design intent, as discussed in the next Section infra.) But
commentary to the Statute clarifies that this language does not alter the defini-
tion of a weapon the use of which the Statute criminalizes, such as bullets
which "expand or flatten easily in the human body." 260 The element refers only
to the mens rea and is intended just to avoid strict liability for personnel issued
these bullets by superiors with no reasonable basis to know they were prohibit-
ed. 2 6 1
b. The Manual's Misstatement of "Unnecessary Suffering"
The concern about "uselessly aggravate[d]" suffering initially articulated
in the 1868 St. Petersburg declaration was more fully developed by paragraph
(e) of Article 23 of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1899 and 1907.
Only the French texts of these agreements are authentic, and the relevant por-
tion of Article 23 reads exactly the same in both versions, prohibiting
"d'employer des armes, des projectiles ou des matidres propres a causer des
maux superflus."262 The meaning was accurately captured in the U.S. transla-
tion of the 1899 text, which declares that it is especially forbidden "to employ
arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury."263 Alt-
hough the actual treaty language was unchanged in 1907, the U.S. version of
that accord inexplicably mistranslated it as "calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering."264 This unilateral U.S. text is the only place that the "calculated"
formulation appears. Subsequent treaties, including Additional Protocol I Arti-
256. Id.
257. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)-(xviii).
258. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 349.
259. Id. (quoting the Rome Statute, Elements of Crime art. 8(2)(b)(xix), Official Records of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First Session, New
York, ICC-ASP/1/3, 112, 146 (Sept. 3-10, 2002)).
260. See WILLIAM A. SCHABUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 243-44 (2010).
261. KRIANGSAK KITTICHAIRSAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 178-79 (2001).
262. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 63; see also WAR DEP'T,
supra note 41, at 153-65 (providing full French text of 1907 treaty).
263. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 63.
264. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, supra note 348, at 116 (providing side-by-
side text of both agreements).
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cle 35(2),265 (recognized by the DoD as CIL); 26 6 Article 8(2)(b)(xx) of the
Rome Statute;267 the preamble of the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conven-
tional Weapons (which received U.S. ratification in 1995); 268 and the 1997 Ot-
tawa Convention;269 all employ "of a nature" to cause,"270 confirming that
states consider it to be the correct linguistic formulation. The difference be-
tween "nature" and "calculated" is significant; the former calls for an objective
assessment of the weapon's actual effect, while "calculated" suggests subjec-
tive intent on the part of the designer. In other words, a weapon actually caus-
ing superfluous injury might still be lawful if a permissible rationale for its de-
sign could be articulated. Given the official French text, and the use of "nature"
rather than "calculated" in subsequent agreements, the Manual's insistence on
the subjective standard is not credible. Its claim that "[1]ike other weapons,
such bullets are only prohibited if they are calculated to cause superfluous inju-
ry thus cannot be true.
But even if the Manual's view of the superfluous injury rule was correct,
it would still only be a general rule that would not overcome the specific prohi-
bition on expanding bullets now accepted as CIL. The Manual's effort to give
supremacy to the superfluous injury standard endeavors to invert the lex spe-
cialis concept it so strongly endorses in other contexts.
This issue goes beyond expanding bullets. The Manual relies upon this
same approach, applying "calculated" rather than "of a nature" to cause in its
overall consideration of weapons legality and required reviews, as well as its
discussion of other specific weapons, such as blades with serrated edges.272
Those sections thus also require careful review to bring the Manual into con-
formance with actual international law.
c. A Claim of U.S. Status as a Persistent Objector to the Ban
Is Not Credible
The Manual stresses the U.S. refusal to join the 1899 Declaration,273 and
claims that it has been consistent in not applying a "distinct prohibition" against
expanding bullets; instead prohibiting such bullets only to the extent they are
"calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." 274 This raises the question as to
whether the United States might fairly claim to be a persistent objector to the
metamorphosis of the ban from treaty law to CIL. The ICRC notes, without en-
265. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 9, art. 35(2).
266. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law-Sniper Use of Open-Tip Ammunition,
ARMY LAw 86, 87 (Feb. 1991).
267. Rome Statute, supra note 236, art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
268. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 80
Stat. 271,1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
269. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507-19.
270. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 63-64.
271. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 347.
272. See id. at 60, 338, 341-45, 349, 357-58, 362-63, 385-86, 1057-58, 1157-58, 1184-85, 1187.
273. See, e.g., id. at 348.
274. Id. at 61-62.
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dorsing its legitimacy, that the United States is the only state that claims the
right to use these weapons.275 The issue is thus whether the United States has
consistently objected to the prohibition of expanding bullets with sufficient
clarity and regularity to qualify for this status.
Ironically, the United States soon faced the same type of challenge that
had led Britain to develop the dum-dum bullet. Knife-wielding Moro warriors
opposing American imperialism in the Philippines demonstrated the ability to
persist in their attacks even after being shot several times by contemporary Ar-
my issue .38 Colt revolvers. The Army thus recognized the need for a handgun
with greater stopping power. 276 In 1904 it conducted test firings of various
types of pistol rounds into live cattle and suspended human cadavers. This
crude study concluded that a minimum handgun caliber of .45 should be adopt-
ed, and also recommended:
In case [ ] an automatic pistol of the caliber recommended, or higher, be adopted for
service at any time, thereby necessitating a jacket, the point of the jacket should be
made thinner and the lead core softer than in the case of any jacketed bullet tried by
or known to the members of the Board . . . . The object of this is, of course, to se-
cure "mushrooming" of [the] bullet, with its attendant great shock effect and stop-
.277
ping power.
In other words, the study recommended adopting both a larger caliber
weapon and expanding bullets. Despite this recommendation, the Army ulti-
mately procured the legendary .45 caliber Model 1911 semi-automatic Colt pis-
tol with a fully-jacketed (non-expanding) round, 278 declining to act contrary to
the Hague rule at its first, and best, opportunity to do so.
While this selection process was ongoing, the United States unsuccessful-
ly proposed amending the Declaration in 1907 to prohibit bullets that "inflict
unnecessarily cruel wounds .. . and, in general, every kind of bullet which [sic]
exceeds the limit necessary for placing a man immediately hors de com-
bat... ."279 Judge Advocate General Davis made clear that the U.S. proposal
was intended to be more restrictive than the Declaration, extending its prohibi-
280
tion to other bullet types. The Army's 1914 Rules of Land Warfare noted
that the United States had not joined the 1899 Declaration, but adhered to the
amendment that it proposed.2 81 Since the amendment was more restrictive than
the Declaration, logically the United States did not object to the substance of
the lesser included rule. We cannot prove that the decision not to adopt an ex-
panding .45 caliber round was based on legal considerations, but such a bullet
would logically be impermissibly excessive under the U.S. formulation given
the stopping power of the jacketed round. In any case, U.S. claims to persistent
275. ICRC CL Study, supra note 125, Rule 77.
276. LEROY THOMPSON, THE COLT 1911 PISTOL 7-8 (2011).
277. The Thompson-Lagarde Report, in JOHN POTOCKI, THE COLT MODEL 1905 AUTOMATIC
PISTOL 121, 163 (1998).
278. See THOMPSON, supra note 276, at 8-14.
279. George B. Davis, Amelioration of the Rules of War on Land, 2 AM J. INT'L L. 63, 77
(1908).
280. Id. at 75-77.
281. WAR DEP'T, supra note 41, at 56 n.1.
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objector status are surely weakened by the fact that it declined to procure these
bullets even when advised to do so by its own expert study team.
The Manual engages in selective, if not duplicitous, citation in support of
its position that there is no CIL ban on expanding bullets. For example, in a
single extensive footnote 78 on page 348,282 it:
(1) truncates Davis's quotation of the U.S. amendment, leaving out the
provision related to bullets which do more than place a man immediately hors
de combat;
(2) indicates that the 1914 Rules of Land Warfare said that the United
States had not ratified the Hague Declaration but omits the proviso stating that
it adheres to the language of its more restrictive proposed amendment;
(3) quotes a 1920 Army publication reporting that "The Judge Advocate
General's Office has given the opinion that the armor-piercing ammunition
[with a soft lead nose that mushrooms] is a lawful weapon," but omits several
highly relevant facts found in the original source.283 First, this was an aircraft
weapon intended for use against material objects-"airplanes, tanks, trucks,
and other defenses"-not an anti-personnel round. So finding this bullet to be
legal would have been consistent with the concurrent treatment of exploding
bullets. Although the latter were categorically banned by the 1868 St. Peters-
burg Declaration, they were employed by both sides during WWI in, and
against, aircraft and observation balloons, which was ultimately considered to
be lawful even while the general ban remained effective with respect to delib-
284erate anti-personnel employment other than by aircraft. Moreover, the armor
piercing bullets under discussion were not actually used. The Army noted that
in the European theater, "any one found with a dumdum bullet on his person is
shot without any formalities," and U.S. pilots were thus hesitant to use it. 285
(Given that the Hague Declaration facially only applied to conflicts in which all
participants were parties-which the United States was not-this suggests that
the ban was already becoming CIL at this time.) As a result, the U.S. leadership
in Europe decided against using the ammunition and General Pershing insisted
that Washington needed to "fumish[ ] new type armor piercing at the earliest
possible moment." 286
(4) indicates (although the citation is woefully incomplete) that a 1985
JAG opinion on the "Use of Expanding Ammunition by U.S. Military Forces in
Counterterrorist Incidents" reiterated that the United States is not a party to the
Hague Declaration. But this citation misleadingly fails to note that the opinion
clearly proclaims that "as a matter of policy," the United States has "acknowl-
edged and respected" the applicability of the Declaration on Expanding Bullets
in "conventional combat operations in the wars in which United States forces
282. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 348, n.78.
283. U.S. ORDNANCE DEP'T, HISTORY OF SMALL-ARMS AMMUNITION 15 (1920).
284. See, e.g., U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 109; WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 142 (2009).
285. U.S. ORDNANCE DEP'T, supra note 283, at 15.
286. Id.
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have participated since the declaration was adopted." 287 The opinion ultimately
bases the U.S. claim to be able to use expanding bullets against terrorists on the
view that such situations fall outside the law of war, not that it is permitted by
that corpus juris.288 So even while asserting that the United States is not bound
by the Declaration rule as treaty law, it also clearly demonstrates that the Unit-
ed States does not object to the rule since it follows it as a matter of policy.
Given that (1) a rule does not require fully universal acceptance to become
CL; (2) there is no evidence of any nation other than the United States ques-
tioning the ban on expanding bullets; and (3) the United States itself follows
the rule as a matter of policy, it is hard to see how the United States can assert
either that the ban is not CIL as a specific prohibition on expanding bullets or
that the United States has a credible claim itself to be a persistent objector.
Although the Manual implies that U.S. opposition to the Declaration's
ban on expanding bullets has been consistent, this fact has escaped the notice of
most of the United States' own experts. Leading U.S. law of war commentators
Michael Schmitt and Gary Solis both recognize the ban as CL without noting
the United States as a persistent objector, despite the fact that both served as
career JAGs in the Air Force and Marine Corps, respectively, before continuing
to serve in DoD in civilian law of war roles.289 And the International and Oper-
ational Law Department of the Army's Judge Advocate General's Legal Center
and School did not recognize this subtlety either; in fact, it accepted a student
thesis290 and published multiple annual volumes of its Operational Law Hand-
book acknowledging this prohibition as recently as 2012.291 This phraseology
was notably-but much too belatedly, for the purpose of establishing qualifica-
tion for persistent objector status-removed from the 2014 version.292 It strains
credibility to assert that the United States could convincingly claim persistent
objector status when most of its own law of war experts were unaware that it
was doing so.
As the totality of this history demonstrates, there is no credible basis to
doubt that the rule against expanding bullets reflects CIL, and having failed to
287. Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, International Law Note, Use of Expanding Am-
munition by U.S. Military Forces in Counterterrorist Incidents, ARMY LAW 45 (Nov. 1985).
288. See id. at 45-46.
289. After serving twenty years as an Air Force JAG, Michael Schmitt served as Dean of the
George C. Marshall European Center, and is currently Director of the Stockton Center for the Study of
International Law and Charles H. Stockton Professor at the United States Naval War College. See Fac-
ulty Profile, Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. NAVAL WAR C., https://www.usnwc.edu/MichaelSchmitt (last
visited Apr. 13, 2017). Gary Solis, who holds a doctorate in the Law of War from the London School of
Economics, is a retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel and a "retired Professor of Law of the United
States Military Academy, where he directed West Point's Law of War program for six years." SOLIS,
supra note 2, at i.
290. See Joshua F. Berry, Hollow Point Bullets: How History Has Hijacked Their Use in Com-
bat and Why It Is Time To Reexamine the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets, 206
MIL. L. REv. 88 (2010) (initially written as a JAG School thesis).
291. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH.,
U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 27 (2012), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/
operational-law-handbook _2012.pdf.
292. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH.,




establish itself as a persistent objector, the United States is now legally bound
as well, even if it has failed to publicly acknowledge this fact.
d. The Importance of Getting the Law on Expanding Bullets
Right
In 1985, the U.S. military replaced the .45 caliber M1911 as its primary
293handgun with the Beretta M9, using the smaller 9mm NATO round. While a
9mm weapon has practical advantages, including much lower recoil and greater
magazine capacity, it also has correspondingly less stopping power. Coming
back full circle to the situation Great Britain faced in the 1890s, U.S. personnel
now complain about their inability to stop determined insurgents in Afghani-
294
stan and Iraq. Some units, including Marine Corps special operations com-
ponents, have therefore continued using older .45s.29
The Army's response, consistent with the Manual's flawed logic, has
been to initiate procurement of a new handgun and expanding bullets to use in
it.296 Despite unilateral U.S. legal rationalizations, the reality is that any other
nation could prosecute U.S. personnel using these rounds as war criminals. This
does not mean that U.S. leaders should condemn our troops to combat with
problematic weapons. As a near-term solution, the United States can acquire
new larger caliber pistols with fully jacketed rounds. In the longer run, in order
to capitalize on the other advantages of a smaller caliber weapon, the CL pro-
hibition on expanding bullets could be overridden by a treaty authorizing the
use of hollow-point expanding bullets in pistols. Given the widespread police
use of these rounds, their ability to protect potential aggression victims by more
effectively incapacitating would-be attackers, the reduced risk of bystander
harm from rounds passing through the intended targeted or ricocheting, and
current global concerns about terrorism-particularly suicide bombers-a care-
fully crafted proposal could predictably command significant international sup-
port. It could be helpful to note that this approach does not really undermine the
Hague Declaration prohibition, which was intended to address the harms of ex-
panding high-velocity rifle bullets, but instead reflects the careful balance be-
tween military necessity and humanitarian considerations at the core of the en-
tire law of war.
Current Army leaders need to follow Pershing's lead in insisting that our
soldiers be given the weapons they need to do their assigned missions while
remaining within the bounds of the law. To procure weapons unilaterally based
on military expediency without addressing the law is nothing more than an ap-
plication of Kriegsraison, which the Manual acknowledges as impermissible.
293. Matthew Cox, U.S. Army Is Considering Hollow-Point Bullets To Go With New Pistol,
MILITARY.COM (July 10, 2015), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/07/10/us-army-is-
considering-hollow-point-bullets-to-go-with-new.html.
294. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 290, at 88-91.
295. THOMPSON, supra note 276, at 55-56.
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2. Legality ofBayonets with Serrated Edges
The Manual states that the law of war contains no specific prohibition
against weapons with serrated edges297 followed by a specific discussion relat-
ed to bayonets:
Many bayonets or knives have a serrated edge (a formation resembling the toothed
edge of a saw). Provided that the design intent of the serrated edge is not to aggra-
vate suffering unnecessarily, such as by making the wound more difficult to treat,
the serrated edge is not prohibited. For example, a serrated edge may improve the
capabilities of the blade as a multipurpose field utility tool, rather than be intended
to increase the pain and suffering of enemy personnel injured by the blade.298
This declaration is predictable; U.S. troops are currently issued bayonets
with serrated edges that double as saws 299 and it would be surprising for DoD
to admit error in doing so. But legal history is not on the U.S. side. The Allies
denounced German serrated-edge ("saw back") bayonets during World War I,
and soldiers captured with one were reportedly subject to summary execu-
tion.300 Unlike expanding bullets, they were never addressed by a specific trea-
ty prohibition, but had to be assessed under the more general CIL treatment of
weapons causing superfluous injury. These bayonets were calculated to do
double duty as saws, but the serrated teeth had the unintended consequence of
aggravating the wound when the weapon was pulled out of the adversary. They
thus became a paradigmatic example of a weapon subject to CIL prohibition on
the basis that they caused unnecessary suffering. Yoram Dinstein explains that
"it is uncontested that-even without a specific treaty provision-the use of
bayonets with a serrated edge ... would be in breach of the norm proscribing
unnecessary suffering to combatants." 301 Similarly, the U.K. Manual states that
bayonets are legal weapons "provided they are not of a nature to cause super-
fluous injury or unnecessary suffering, for example, because they have . .. ser-
rated edges." 302 The Hague Regulation prohibition of weapons causing unnec-
essary suffering is now incorporated into U.S. federal criminal law as well.303
Design intent-which the Manual contends should be relied upon rather
than practical effect for determining whether a weapon causes unnecessary suf-
fering-logically does matter in the very limited sense that the mere possibility
of impermissible misuse should not render an otherwise lawful implement or
297. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 344.
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. See, e.g., Tony Perry, New Bayonet Puts Marine Corps on the Cutting Edge, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2003), http://articles.1atimes.com/2003/jan/19/nation/na-bayonetl9.
300. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of Modern Warfare, in
DRONE WARS: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, LAW, AND POLICY 388, 396 (Peter L. Bergen & Daniel
Rothenberg, eds., 2015). The practice of summarily executing soldiers found with serrated edged-
bayonets is described in highly regarded novels written from the perspective of both sides in the conflict.
See JOSEPH BOYDEN, THREE DAY ROAD 62 (2005); ERICH MARIA REMARQUE, ALL QUIET ON THE
WESTERN FRONT 103 (Ballantine Books, 1982) (1929).
301. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 67.
302. See U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 105.
303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2) (defining violations of Hague Article 23 as war crimes subject
to punishment by life in prison if either perpetrator or victim is a U.S. national).
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weapon illegal. 304 But generally speaking, legality is determined by the weap-
on's "nature," as virtually all sources relying on the authentic Hague Land
Warfare Regulation language agree; weapons regulations would be meaning-
less if states could avoid their application simply by asserting an "innocent"
subjective intent.
It is unclear how the United States came to adopt its current bayonets, alt-
hough it is not terribly surprising that once having made this decision, the DoD
Manual endeavors to excuse or justify it rather than admitting that the services
made a legal error.
3. Cluster Munitions Precautions
Cluster munitions are conventional bombs or artillery rounds which dis-
perse explosive submunitions (called "bomblets") over a wide area. A typical
cluster bomb might contain 200 to 300 bomblets, which could be dispersed
over an area as large as 1,100 by 1,600 feet (forty acres or sixteen hectares).3 05
The Implementation Support Unit for the Convention on Cluster Munitions
notes two major concerns about these weapons:
Firstly, they have wide area effects and are unable to distinguish between civilians
and combatants. Secondly, the use of cluster munitions leave behind large numbers
of dangerous unexploded ordnance. Such remnants kill and injure civilians, obstruct
economic and social development, and have other severe consequences that persist
306for years and decades after use.
To its credit, the United States has been somewhat responsive to these
concerns. The DoD has unilaterally committed to fielding munitions with a dud
rate of no more than one percent by 2018, and requires that top-level com-
manders approve the use of existing weapons prior to that time. 307
The DoD Manual unequivocally declares that cluster munitions "are not
specifically prohibited or restricted by the law of war," 308 but this is not quite
accurate. The international community partially addressed long-term concerns
in the Explosive Remnants of War Protocol to the UN Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW), which the United States has ratified.309 Despite
U.S. objections, a comprehensive ban was then incorporated in the subsequent
Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions that now has one hundred other state
304. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARNED CONFLICT 143-45 (2009)
(discussing similar design intent issues with respect to bullets that flatten easily).
305. See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 2, at 591. The area values are obtained by multiplying the dis-
persal dimensions provided by Solis (1,600 x 1,000 feet) and dividing by the number of square feet in an
acre (43,560) and square feet in a hectare (107,639) respectively.
306. Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature Dec. 3 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39.
307. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 404 (stating that approval authority rests with "combatant
commanders"); see 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (mandating that combatant commanders report only to the
Secretary of Defense and President).
308. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 403.
309. Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Chemical Weapons,
opened for signature Nov. 28, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.3, 2399 U.N.T.S. 100.
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parties: more than half the current world order. 310 So at most the Manual should
state that the United States is not party to an agreement prohibiting these weap-
ons.
Although ultimately explaining the rules that the Convention imposes on
ratifying states, the Manual extols cluster munitions' virtues while neglecting to
specifically inform commanders of the legal obligations concerning the unex-
ploded ordinance that inevitably results from their employment. 3 1 Of equal, if
not greater concern, despite the documented horrors of continuing post-conflict
civilian casualties, the Manual gives commanders a free pass with respect to
having to consider any longer-term impact of cluster munitions use, having
previously dismissed such considerations as "too remote" to require inclusion
in proportionality calculus.3 12
Unlike the previously discussed examples of expanding bullets and ser-
rated bayonets, the consistent U.S. approach to cluster munitions should qualify
it as a persistent objector if a cluster munitions ban were to become CIL. But
this does not excuse the United States from having to comply with either the
Explosive Remnants of War accord, or the principles of distinction and propor-
tionality, and the Manual should be more explicit about the application of these
requirements to cluster munitions.
III. THE DOD MANUAL AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the Manual explains, the law of war is international law, which "com-
prises treaties and customary international law applicable to the United
States." 313 Although its substantive treatment of treaty rules is generally unob-
jectionable-stylistic concerns about verbosity and redundancy discussed in the
next Part notwithstanding-this is not true of the Manual's handling of CIL.
Customary rules are a critical component of the contemporary law of war.
The universally ratified Geneva Conventions are the best known, and most
widely cited, law of war instruments. But what is less well appreciated is that
they only provide protections for specific categories of persons who no longer
are, or never were, lawful objects of attack. Core warfighting rules, in contrast,
come primarily from (1) unratified draft treaties; 3 14 (2) older treaties not in
force with the majority of nations that gained independence since World War
II; 315 and (3) Additional Protocol I, ratified by 174 other states, but not the
310. SoLs, supra note 2, 590-93; Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 306; Imple-
mentation Support Unit, . . . and Palau is Number 100 (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.clusterconvention.org/2016/04/20/palau-bans-cluster-munitions-and-is-the-
100th-state-party/
311. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 379. No mention is made anywhere in the sections on
cluster munitions about the obligations with respect to unexploded ordnance, which are subsequently
addressed at 419-32, while nothing in these latter sections alerts the reader to
312. Id. at 242 n.308.
313. Id. at 7.
314. See Hague Draft Rules, supra note 221
315. See, e.g., Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of
War, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 242, at 111.
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United States. These rules thus generally govern U.S. conduct today to the ex-
tent that they are CIL.
This Part will address concerns about the Manual's application of CL
concepts and its definition of the law of war, as well as the credibility and per-
suasiveness (or lack thereof) of the sources relied upon in support of many of
the Manual's assertions about the current content of customary law.
A. Application ofInternational Law Concepts
In endeavoring to identify applicable international rules, the Manual relies
upon both an idiosyncratic approach to the formation of CIL, as well as defini-
tions of several international law concepts, which it employs in problematic
ways. These include internal inconsistencies or contradictions between the
Manual's definitions and its own use of sources. In some cases, these ap-
proaches are contrary to larger U.S. national interests, calling for careful recon-
sideration of many provisions or supporting citations, as well as a comprehen-
sive interagency review of the overall text.
1. Formation ofInternational Law
Recognizing gaps in existing treaty coverage, the ICRC undertook a dec-
ade-long effort to identify CIL rules applicable to modem armed conflicts. In
2005, the study culminated in a mammoth publication divided into two parts:
Volume I provides thorough explanations of the rules, and Volume II exten-
sively details supporting evidence of state practice.36
Although most of the 161 rules identified in the study are unexceptional,
then-State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger and the DoD General
Counsel William Haynes submitted a joint letter to the ICRC criticizing the
study's methodology. 317 While conceding that a "significant number" of the
overall rules were either treaty law or CL, at least in international conflicts, the
letter stressed that "the United States is concerned about the methodology used
to ascertain rules and about whether the authors have proffered sufficient facts
and evidence to support those rules."3 18 Among the specific criticisms were
concerns that the study cited state practice "insufficiently dense to meet the 'ex-
tensive and virtually uniform' standard" required by international law, that it
relied too heavily on military manuals, and that it "fails to pay due regard to the
practice of specially affected States." 3 19 These concerns are now echoed in the
DoD Manual, which incorporates the Bellinger-Haynes letter as a "frequently
cited document" meriting its own short form abbreviation, and makes extensive
316. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contri-
bution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 175, 175-78 (2005).
317. The Nov. 11, 2006 letter was reprinted in the International Review of the Red Cross. See
John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A U.S. Government Response to the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 443
(2007).
318. Id. at 443-44.
319. Id. at 444-45.
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use of it, particularly with respect to the specific rules the letter objected to.320
But there are several contentious aspects of this approach.
First, as explored further later in this Part, the Manual itself fails to meas-
ure up to the standards it proclaims, relying extensively on single examples of
U.S. practice, and prior U.S. military manuals, as the only support for the exist-
ence of many rules it declares to be CL.
Second, the Manual gives insufficient recognition to the contribution of
treaties to the crystallization of new CL rules. Its section captioned "Relation-
ship Between Treaties and Customary Intemational Law," focuses on the rela-
tionship of treaties with existing CIL, noting that treaty provisions may "(1) not
reflect customary international law; (2) reflect customary international law; or
(3) be based on customary law, but not precisely reflect it." 321 It then down-
plays the relationship by noting, "[i]n most cases, treaty provisions do not re-
flect customary international law." 322 But it fails to address the ability of provi-
sions originating as treaty law to become CIL.
Draft conclusion 12 of the International Law Commission's work on CIL,
in contrast, declares:
A treaty provision may reflect or come to reflect a rule of customary in-
ternational law if it is established that the provision in question:
(1) at the time when the treaty was concluded, codifies an existing rule of
customary international law;
(2) has led to the crystallization of an emerging rule of customary interna-
tional law; or
(3) has generated a new rule of customary international law, by giving
rise to a general practice accepted as law.323
Those familiar with the modem law of war will recognize the major im-
pact treaties-both ratified and not-have had on its development. Many rules
in areas governed by CIL today, particularly air and naval warfare, have direct
roots in these historic treaty sources.324
Moreover, the United States is critically reliant on provisions created
from whole cloth in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention concerning transit
passage through international straits and archipelagic waters in order to main-
tain naval access to key strategic regions such as the Arabian Gulf and Mediter-
ranean Sea. Since the United States has failed to ratify this treaty, it necessarily
insists that these rules-which are incorporated as "law" in the Manual's naval
warfare chapter 325-immediately became CIL upon the treaty's entry into
force. The failure to address this aspect of international practice is thus short-
sighted.
320. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, § xxvi.
321. Id. at 30.
322. Id.
323. Int'l Law Comm'n, Third Rep. on Identification of Customary International Law, U.N.
Doc A/CN.4/682, at 31 (2015).
324. See, e.g., U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 4-12; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 242, at 7-
8.
325. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 879-86.
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In a similar vein, the Manual endeavors to classify the broad underlying
law of war principles (e.g., necessity, distinction, proportionality) as "general
principles of law common to the major legal systems of the world" as that term
is used in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identify-
ing primary sources of law to be applied by the ICJ.326 But this misunderstands
the fundamental concept; these core law of war principles are unique to the in-
ternational law of armed conflict, they are not derived from widespread nation-
al domestic laws. Moreover, the sources cited by the Manual specifically dis-
cuss the "Martens clause," created from whole cloth in the 1899 Hague Land
Warfare Convention, which addresses sources of law to be applied in the ab-
sence of treaty rules,327 not the core law of war principles.
2. Specially Affected States
The Manual, like the U.S. response to the ICRC study, places significant
emphasis on the role of "specially affected states," declaring that "States that
have had a wealth of experience, or that have otherwise had significant oppor-
tunities to develop a carefully considered military doctrine, may be expected to
have contributed a greater quantity and quality of State practice relevant to the
law of war than States that have not."328 (Ironically "military doctrine" is found
in publications, which DoD declaims as a legal source; a footnote in this sec-
tion nevertheless quotes international judge Theodor Meron on how states de-
velop law through "military manuals." 329)
The Manual's use of "specially affected state" is overbroad. The term
comes from the International Court of Justice decision delimiting North Sea
continental shelf claims in which the ICJ discusses whether a "purely conven-
tional rule" can rapidly become CIL and apply to states not party to the treaty.
The Court says this could happen, as a result of participation in the convention
by "States whose interests were specially affected," or within a comparatively
short amount of time if "State practice, including that of States whose interests
are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uni-
form." 330 But this does not require the concurrence of all "specially affected
states" to a rule for it to become CIL, as the Manual claims. 33 1
The North Sea discussion is directly relevant to the issue of UNCLOS
rules quickly becoming CIL, but the Manual misses the opportunity to make
use of that fact. Reading between the lines, it seems to be asserting that as the
leading military power, and the state perhaps most frequently resorting to the
use of force in the modem era, the United States should have the dominant say
326. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 5.
327. See id. at 50 n.3.
328. Id. at 32.
329. Id. at 32 n. 141 (quoting Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation
of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 249 (1996)).
330. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Get. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 1.C.J. 3, IN 73-74 (Feb.
28).
331. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 32.
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in establishing the content of the current law of war. But that is not quite how
international law, formally based on sovereign equality, works.
3. Persistent Objector Status
A key difference between treaties and CIL rules is that the former only
bind states voluntarily ratifying them; the latter generally bind all states. Alt-
hough some commentators, including Manual critic Jordan Paust, disagree,332
the clear majority view is that there is a narrow exception from individual CIL
rules for states qualifying as "persistent objectors." As the appellation implies,
a state must both object to the emerging rule at the time of its formation, and
persist in that objection over time, to qualify. 333
The DoD Manual presents an incomplete expression of this concept,
however, and endeavors to require only the initial objection while conveniently
ignoring the "persistent" element. 334 It thus seeks to avoid the application of at
least one widely recognized CIL rule, the prohibition on expanding bullets, on
the grounds that the United States did not join the initial agreement that later
ripened into customary law. 335 There are two distinct flaws with this argument.
First, the initial U.S. declination only establishes that it did not wish to be
bound by those rules as treaty law at the time of the agreement's conclusion; a
claim to persistent objector status requires demonstrable objection at the time,
which could be substantially later, when the treaty rule began to evolve into
customary law. Moreover, initial objection is a necessary, but insufficient, con-
dition for establishing exemption from a customary rule; the state has to
demonstrate persistence in that objection "repeated as often as circumstances
require."336 So the burden of proof on would-be persistent objectors is much
greater than just showing an initial refusal to be bound by a treaty.
4. The Concept of Lex Specialis and the Application ofHuman
Rights Law
A significant legal issue confronting militaries today, particularly those
combating non-state actors, is the applicability vel non of international human
rights law (IHRL) alongside law of war rules.337 The challenge is particularly
acute for U.S. allies because the European Court of Human Rights holds that
human rights mandates can follow them into conflict overseas.338 The United
States has adopted two lines of defense. One is a general denial of the extrater-
332. See, e.g., Paust supra note 11.
333. Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Identification of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 1 95, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/682 (Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Third Report on Identification of
Customary International Law].
334. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1.
335. See id. at 345.
336. Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 333, ¶ 93.
337. Beth Van Schaack, The United States' Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Hu-
man Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 20, 20-21 (2014).
338. See, e.g., Kirby Abbott, A Brief Overview of Legal Interoperability Challenges for NATO
Arising from the Interrelationship Between IHL and IHRL in Light of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, 96 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 107 (2015).
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339ritorial application of its own human rights obligations. But the issue is com-
plicated by situations of occupation, where the outside power exercises juris-
diction over territory, and by U.S. arguments defending its drone programs that
mix law of war and self-defense justifications. 340 The latter potentially impli-
cate IHRL considerations regarding the right to life, due process requirements,
etc.
The second U.S. approach is to deny the application of IHRL to conflict
situations. The Manual thus forcefully asserts a broad conception of lex special-
is-the legal principle holding that "the special rule overrides the general
law" 34 1 -calling for other bodies of law to either give way entirely to, or else
be interpreted consistent with, the law of war.342 In support, it asserts that "tra-
ditionally, the law of war has been described as the only 'authoritative rules of
action between hostile armies,' or as superseding ordinary law in the actual
theater of military operations," citing two obsolete nineteenth century sources,
the Lieber Code and Colonel William Winthrop's 1896 military law treatise. 343
This categorical legal subordination made sense in an age when there was only
a black and white choice between the international law of war and purely do-
mestic law. But subsequent state acceptance of binding IHRL renders this view
obsolete and undermines the credibility of sources predating that law's crea-
tion.
The Manual also glosses over the fact that lex specialis only comes into
play when two rules conflict. IHRL rules that do not contravene law of war
mandates, and are not validly derogated from, should remain fully effective
during hostilities. U.S. efforts to assert the inapplicability of specific law of war
rules, such as those governing prisoners of war, 3 to its current adversaries ac-
tually opens the door to wider IHRL application. When fewer law of war rules
apply, there will be fewer conflicts with IHRL rules, and hence a greater role
for the latter.
We do not dispute that the law of war is the lex specialis in armed con-
flict, or that its mandates prevail when in direct conflict with rules from other
more general bodies of law. But IHRL continues to apply in wartime, and a
number of factors, including efforts to exclude non-state participants from law
of war protections, the future possibility of the U.S. being as an occupying
power again, and the trend toward coalition operations, all demand that U.S.
military personnel have substantive guidance on human rights law. The Manu-
al's blanket reliance on lex specialis in lieu of meaningful explication of IHRL
mandates thus does U.S. personnel a real disservice.
339. See Van Schaack, supra note 337, at 22-23.
340. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, Justice Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes
on Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_ news/
2013/02/04/1684301 4 -justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans.
341. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 9.
342. See id.at 9-10.
343. Id.atl0n.18.
344. See, e.g., Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., Hu-
mane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002),
www.pegc.us/archive/white-house/Bush-memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
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B. Questionable Source Selection Practices
It is generally not difficult to identify the treaties that a state has ratified
and locate their texts. 345 While treaty rules must be included in a comprehen-
sive legal reference, the Manual's more difficult task is systematically identify-
ing and explaining applicable CIL rules. Although the Manual acknowledges
that legal commentary is "only as authoritative as the evidence upon which [it
is] based," 346 it fails to heed its own admonition. The methodology employed in
selecting citations for many rules, as well as many cited authorities themselves,
are troublesome, impairing the Manual's credibility as a valid reflection of cur-
rent CL. Many of the rules it articulates, for example, are supported only by
citation to obscure or obsolete documents, or to isolated, historical events that
do little to establish widespread state practice or sense of opiniojuris.
There is little doubt, for example, that the most important sources of rules
governing the conduct of hostilities are the Hague Conventions produced by the
"peace conferences" of 1899 and 1907, particularly the detailed land warfare
regulations annexed to Convention (II) of 1899347 and slightly revised in
1907.348 The 1946 Nuremberg judgment declared that the 1907 version had be-
come CL by 1939, making it an integral part of the modem law of war,349 and
violations of its Articles 23, 25, 27, and 28 are now U.S. federal offenses in the
United States under the War Crimes Act of 1996.350 These developments make
the 1899 version relevant only to historical inquiries about pre-World War II
events. It was barely mentioned in the Army's 1914 manual, which primarily
cited the 1907 Regulations. 351 Yet, the 2015 Manual includes the 1899 Regula-
tions as a frequently cited document,352 as well as other historical artifacts that
include Grotius' 1625 text De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres; Emer de Vattel's
The Law of Nations, first published in 1758; John Bassett Moore's 1906 A Di-
gest ofInternational Law; and multiple earlier versions of current U.S. military
manuals. 353 All are great resources for students of legal history, but are irrele-
vant to explicating the current law.
Some older sources seem to be included to permit the assertion of obso-
lete views. The claim that a POW can be ordered to receive medical treatment
345. Effective law of war treaties adopted through 1999 are reprinted in ROBERTS & GUELFF,
supra note 242. The ICRC provides a comprehensive collection of historical documents dating back to
1856. Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/ihl
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
346. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 36.
347. Annex to the Hague Convention (11) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Regulations].
348. Annex to the 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 40.. The 1899 and 1907 versions are
reprinted side by side in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 107-29 (1915).
349. See Judgement: The Law of the Charter, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2) (2006).
351. See WAR DEP'T, supra note 41, at 8 (listing sources used in the Manual), 11-12 (listing
important legal developments), 153-65 (reprinting the French and English texts of the 1907 treaty).
352. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at xvii.
353. Id. at xviii-xxvii.
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against his or her will, for example, was based largely on a 1958 U.K. law of
war manual provision allowing force-feeding. 354 But this rule was cut from the
2004 U.K. Manual,35 5 suggesting it is no longer recognized as valid law.
Oddly missing from the DoD Manual's source list are respected modem
commentaries produced via the collective wisdom of international experts. It
makes no direct use of the 1994 San Remo Manual on naval warfare, 356 even
though that volume is the primary source relied on for the U.K. Manual's mari-
time warfare discussion, 35 7 figures prominently in the work of leading com-
mentators, and is referenced by the annotated supplement to the U.S. Navy's
operational law manual.359 Its only appearance in the Manual is a passing men-
tion in a quote in one footnote.3 60 Similarly, the 2010 Harvard Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) manual on air and missile
361 362warfare is cited only once in the entire air warfare chapter, while there is
no mention whatsoever of the 2013 NATO-sponsored Tallinn Manual on cyber
warfare. 363 Nor is significant reliance placed on two important works carried
out under ICRC auspices, the multi-year study on CIL governing armed con-
flict 3  and a subsequent interpretation on what constitutes direct participation
in hostilities (DPH), causing civilians to lose immunity from attack.365
The Manual is similarly biased in favor of classical, yet dated, works by
individual commentators, to the general exclusion of even widely regarded re-
cent work. It includes numerous citations to Winthrop's famous, but obsolete,
1896 treatise on military justice, for example. 366 Although the Manual cites a
posthumous 1920 reprint,367 Winthrop died in April 1899,368 and his work (like
Lieber's), thus entirely predates the modem law of war codification, which be-
gan in earnest with the convening of the first Hague conference the next month.
354. Id. at 449 n.104.
355. See U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59.
356. INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
357. See U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, 347-75 (enumerating the current laws governing naval
warfare while citing the San Remo Manual in 115 of 150 footnotes).
358. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 111-15 (citing the
San Remo Manual thirteen times in five pages of discussion of naval warfare issues).
359. See supra note 54, at xxxi.
360. See LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 460 n.320.
361. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV.,
COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE (2010).
362. LOW MANUAL, supra note I, at 933 n.103. [The HPCR manual is cited a second time in a
later chapter on cyber warfare]; see id. at 1021 n.52.
363. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Mi-
chael Schmitt ed., 2013).
364. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 248.
365. NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009).
366. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (1920) (Government Printing
Office "Second edition" reproduction of 1896 volume); see also LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 515
n.31.
367. Id. at xxvi.
368. JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, THE BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY LAW 312 (2009).
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Similarly, Gerhard von Glahn's classic 1957 text on belligerent occupa-
tion369 is listed as a frequent source and cited almost thirty times; Eyal Benven-
isti's well-regarded more modem work on the same subject 370 appears only
once, as a secondary source following an initial cite to von Glahn.371 This real-
ly matters: von Glahn wrote before the adoption of any modem human rights
accords, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights372 or
Additional Protocol I, which also addresses occupation. 373 Critical readers must
thus consider that older sources might be cited to avoid acknowledging subse-
quent developments constraining U.S. conduct in ways DoD wishes to avoid.
C. Reliance on Dubious Individual Sources (or no Source at All)
In addition to these systematic source issues, many individual citations
are uniquely troublesome, impairing their credibility as persuasive indicators of
current international law. Some of these citations distill down to assertions that
are really nothing more than claims that something can legally be done today
just because an example of past U.S. practice or document articulating authori-
ty to do so can be found. And in many cases, the Manual cites authorities that
are not considered authoritative reflections of the law domestically, and are
even less credible as indicators of current international law. Examples include
citations to unilateral argument in a government brief,374 to a concurring opin-
37 5376ion in a case later reversed on appeal, 3 and to a Supreme Court dissent.
Some sources initially appear credible, but are problematic under more
careful scrutiny. The Manual asserts, for example, that it is permissible for
POWs to be "secured temporarily with handcuffs, flex cuffs, blindfolds, or oth-
er security devices." 377 The sole source is an oral answer by Winston Churchill
to parliamentary questioning in October 1942. Those unfamiliar with the back-
story might tend to give a Churchillian pronouncement significant deference.
Knowing that this was a unilateral pronouncement at the outset of a major in-
ternational brouhaha over POW shackling with which its closest allies, Canada
and the United States, were not in full accord at the time, could alter that con-
clusion.378 It would at least have been more credible to cite the later joint Brit-
369. GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY (1957).
370. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2004).
371. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 753 n.97.
372. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
373. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 3(b).
374. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 753 n.97.
375. Id. at 73-74 n.21 (providing examples of two distinct issues by citing to the concurrence of
Williams, J. in the D.C. Circuit's consideration of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
reversed in its entirety the next year by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
376. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 81 n.60 (citing to the dissent of Thomas, J. in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld). It is unclear, however, whether this citation is for a legal or factual assertion.
377. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 552.
378. See Kiera Bridley, Allied Unshackling: British, Canadian, and American Prisoner of War
Diplomacy During the Shackling Reprisals, 1942-43 (May 2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Minnesota
State University); see also JONATHAN F. VANCE, OBJECTS OF CONCERN: CANADIAN PRISONERS OF WAR
THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 134-48 (1994) (discussing the overall policy differences between
Canada and Britain over the management of the shackling incident).
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ish-Canadian statement on battlefield shackling together with Roosevelt's con-
curring views. 379 But even trilateral agreement leaves room for real doubt about
the validity of this assertion as actual CL.
The Manual cites extensively to historical examples of unilateral U.S.
conduct, which makes little sense given its own assertion that CIL formation
requires "extensive and virtually uniform" state practice. 380 Although conced-
ing that the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (GPW) "generally re-
quires that POWs be interned ... on land,"381 for example, the Manual declares
it permissible to conduct detention aboard ships at sea supported only by a New
York Times report of U.S. detention of "a Somali man for months aboard a Na-
vy ship before taking him to New York ... for a civilian trial."382
A country cannot logically claim authority to do something today just be-
cause it has done the same thing previously. Prior conduct alone fails to estab-
lish legality at the time of the original act, let alone now. One footnote even re-
lies upon U.S. Korean War action that the ICRC contended was impermissible
at the time.383 The ICRC's opinion does not definitely establish that the United
States was wrong, of course, but without more credible evidence to bolster the
U.S. view, it is certainly imprudent to consider it to have been right. Moreover,
law changes over time. Spies can no longer be shot without trial, 384 nor military
law breakers flogged. 8 So the previous legality of conduct is an insufficient
basis to establish that it remains so today.
Other Manual provisions are sourced only to unilateral U.S. rules. The as-
sertion that the controversial force-feeding of hunger striking Guantanamo de-
tainees is permissible, for example, is just supported by a citation to one U.S.
document authorizing the practice.386 (Strangely, the previous citation to the
1958 U.K. Manual387 is not repeated even though more directly relevant here.)
The DoD volume ignores credible arguments that force-feeding is contrary to
medical ethics and international law, a conclusion reportedly reached by other
U.S. military lawyers considering the issue.388 In essence, the Manual's logic is
nothing more than asserting that a unilateral U.S. assertion of authority is suffi-
cient to justify conduct based on that assertion.
The Manual explicitly cautions that citations to the work of "publicists"
should be subjected to a high standard, both as to whose views should be used,
379. See id. at 50, 61 n.133.
380. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 31.
381. Id. at 60.
382. Id. at 520 n.63.
383. Id. at 567 n.248.
384. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 40, art. 30.
385. WINTHROP, supra note 366, at *669 (reporting the final abolishment of flogging as a mili-
tary punishment in August 1861); WAR OFFICE, supra note 161, at Chapter XIV, The Laws and Usages
of War on Land, § 450 (declaring corporal punishment "and cruelty in any form" as impermissible pun-
ishments for war crimes).
386. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 521 n.72.
387. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
388. Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, U.S. Military Document Says Force-Feeding
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and that "writings should only be relied upon to the degree they accurately re-
flect existing law, rather than the author's views about what the law should
be." 389 Inexplicably, it then includes numerous citations to writings by obscure
individuals, and even some "supporting" quotations explicitly indicating they
address law as the writer thinks it should be (lexferenda) rather than as it is (lex
lata). For example, the Manual supports the assertion that persons "[e]ngaged
in . . . service in the interests of the enemy State" could be captured if found on
a neutral vessel with a citation to a JAG Journal article by a serving U.S. of-
ficer, Joe Munster, addressing the need for "old rules concerning the removal of
persons from neutral shipping" to be updated.390 Similarly, the Manual takes an
aggressive stance on the law governing hospital ships, arguing that they can be
outfitted with secure communications-despite express prohibition against this
in the universally ratified GWS-Sea Convention-and weapons beyond the
minimal self-defense standard permitted by that treaty. 391 But a primary source
cited by this section reports the U.S. Navy's desire to change the law to permit
these measures, again providing clear evidence that these assertions are lex
392ferenda, not lex lata.
D. Citations to Erroneous Translations
Many fundamental law of war rules originated as treaty language that
subsequently came to be respected as law by states not party to the original
agreements. The 1907 Hague Land Warfare Regulations are the paradigmatic
example, recognized as binding on all states by the outbreak of World War I
despite treaty wording limiting application to conflicts in which "all of the bel-
ligerents are parties." 393
In at least two significant instances, the Manual relies on demonstrably
flawed English translations of the authentic French Hague text, resulting in
plainly erroneous statements of the actual law. With respect to belligerent oc-
cupation, for example, the Manual misrepresents Hague Regulations Article 43
as requiring that an occupier "take all the measures in his power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety," 394 based on the original
U.S. English translation. But the authoritative French text reads "I'ordre et la
vie publics" ("order and public life")-a more extensive obligation 395 that the
United States failed to uphold, with disastrous consequences, following the
2003 Iraq invasion. 396 And the Manual's treatment of weapons regulation, in-
cluding its assertion that the United States is not bound by widely recognized
prohibition on expanding bullets, discussed in Part II supra, is based on a
389. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 36.
390. Id. at 1000 n.312.
391. Id.at487.
392. Id. at 482 n.321 (quoting Michael Sirak, US Navy Seeks to Revise Laws of War on Hospi-
tal Ships, JANE'S DEFENSE WKLY. 1-3 (Aug. 19, 2003)).
393. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 242, at 68.
394. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 773 (emphasis added).
395. See, e.g., BENVENISTI, supra note 370, at 78 (favoring translation as "public order and civ-
il life").
396. Glazier, supra note 30.
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flawed translation of Hague Regulations Article 23 dealing with superfluous
* - 397
injury.
E. Entirely Unsupported Assertions
Because the Manual is awash in 6,916 footnotes, it is easy to overlook the
fact that some significant assertions are unsupported by any authority at all.
section 6.5.3.1, "Serrated Edges," provides a critical example, stating without
any support that "[t]he law of war does not prohibit the use of serrated-edged
weapons by military forces, including against enemy personnel." 398 The prob-
lem is that, as discussed in Part II supra, customary law rules have long banned
this type of weapon.
Similarly, section 17.17.1.1. asserts, without support, that "a state may
detain persons belonging to enemy armed groups, by analogy to the detention
of POWs in international armed conflict." 399 The authors likely feel compelled
to include this provision as it describes U.S. practice with respect to GuantAna-
mo, but that does not establish its legality.
Without the provision of more credible supporting authority, the Manual
will fail to persuade critical readers-particularly those outside the United
States-that it has the law right on many of these points. That it very well may
be wrong on many matters should give U.S. personnel serious grounds to ques-
tion whether they should place any significant reliance on those assertions not
cited to actual treaties or other reputable sources.
IV. KEY OMISSIONS AND FORMAT ISSUES IMPACTING THE MANUAL'S UTILITY
To be of meaningful use to operational forces, a military manual must
provide comprehensive yet clear, concise, and accessible explanations of appli-
cable law. But as U.K. defense official Juliet Bartlett wryly observed about the
Manual, "This is not a little book!" 400 At twelve-hundred pages, the Manual is
twice the overall length of its U.K. equivalent, yet the latter includes detailed
tables of authorities, reproduces technical appendices from key treaties, and in-
corporates a comprehensive 118-page index, all lacking from the U.S. ver-
sion.40 1 The lack of an index alone should have been sufficient reason to find
the Manual unsuitable for release in its current form. The U.K. Manual's well-
written substantive text is thus less than forty percent the size of its prolix DoD
402counterpart.
397. See supra Section lI.C.I.b.
398. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 344.
399. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1063.
400. Juliet Bartlett, U.K. Ministry of Defence, Address at American Society of International
Law Annual Meeting Panel on the DoD Law of War Manual (Mar. 31, 2016).
401. See U.K. MANUAL supra note 59.
402. While differences in margins and typefaces, as well as the excessive "below the line" con-
tent in DoD's footnotes may explain some of this difference, the substantive body of the U.K. Manual
contains 445 pages compared to 1,147 for the U.S. version. Compare LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, with
U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59.
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A. Critical Omissions
1. Failure to Identify Currently Recognized War Crimes
Justice requires that an individual subject to potential criminal prosecu-
tion be able to determine ex ante what conduct will run afoul of the law. The
international community has sought to avoid any repetition of the Nuremberg
Tribunal's somewhat controversial application of previously undefined "crimes
against humanity" and "crimes against peace," by clearly prohibiting ex post
facto crime creation in subsequent international human rights and law of war
instruments.4 03 Unfortunately, there is no single authoritative source that either
U.S. personnel, or enemies risking prosecution by them, can consult, or that the
United States can rely upon as a shield to protect our own personnel from im-
permissible liability when in foreign hands. This is a real concern given the
Manual's own documentation of enemy attempts to fabricate allegations of
U.S. war crimes. 404 Although the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court includes a substantial set of agreed upon war crimes (forty-six offenses
applicable to international armed conflict and twenty-eight in non-international
struggles), 405 it was understood by the drafters that these fixed limits on the ju-
risdiction of that tribunal were not an all-inclusive list of what CL might per-
mit states to try. 406
The U.K. Manual provides both a complete itemization of the crimes de-
fined by earlier treaties and the Rome Statute and identifies additional CL war
crimes, such as "mutilation of a dead body" and "firing on shipwrecked per-
sonnel." 407 The DoD Manual, in contrast unhelpfully provides alternative defi-
nitions of war crimes as either "any violation of the law of war," 408 which
could include such trivial infractions as medical personnel failing to wear a dis-
409 41
tinctive armband, or "particularly serious violations of the law of war,"410
without ever proffering a U.S. Government position. International criminal law
and law-of-war scholars, in contrast, have generally defined a war crime as "a
serious violation" of the international law of war entailing "individual criminal
responsibility." 4 11 More importantly, the Manual fails to provide any sem-
blance of a complete list of war crimes beyond grave breaches of the 1949 Ge-
403. See, e.g., David Glazier, Destined for an Epic Fail: The Problematic Guantanamo Military
Commissions, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 903, 965 (2014).
404. See, e.g., LOW Manual, supra note 1, 468 n.239.
405. Rome Statute, supra note 236, art. 8.
406. See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 271 (3d ed. 2014).
407. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at 422-27, 432-35.
408. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1093-94.
409. Id. at 1094.
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., CRYER ET AL., supra note 406, at 268 (endorsing the criteria identified by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Tadic decision); SOLIS, supra note 2, at
302 (quoting U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 24 (1948)).
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neva Conventions; only a handful of other crimes are sporadically identified in
isolated parts of the Manual.412
This omission does a real disservice to both individual U.S. service per-
sons, who are unable to assess the scope of their own liability, and to larger
U.S. efforts to effectively prosecute violations and defend against excessive
claims of authority to try our own personnel. It also means that the Manual fails
413to fulfill one of the most basic requirements for a publication of this genre.
2. Failure to Enumerate the Status of the Additional Protocols as
Customary International Law
The Manual fails to provide U.S. personnel with definitive legal guidance
on Additional Protocol I and II of 1977, the two single most important treaties
governing international and non-international armed conflict, respectively. Un-
til that time the law of war had two distinct branches: "Geneva Law" providing
humanitarian safeguards for persons protected from attack, and "Hague Law"
addressing means and methods of warfare. This distinction broke down with
Additional Protocol I.414 Although formally updating the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions' humanitarian protections, it included additional rules addressing the con-
duct of hostilities as well. This broad scope makes it of critical importance,
along with the much shorter Additional Protocol II which concurrently expand-
ed legal regulation of non-international conflict.
While the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified, en-
suring their applicability to any international conflict, the Additional Protocols
have been slightly less successful. Additional Protocol I has 174 state parties,
including China, Russia, and most NATO members, but Yoram Dinstein notes
that "a determined minority-led by the United States-has utterly rejected sa-
lient portions of the Protocol."415 President Reagan informed the Senate that he
would not submit Additional Protocol I for its approval due to such shortcom-
ings as its treatment of "wars of national liberation" as international armed con-
flicts, and belief that it would "grant combatant status to irregular forces." 4 16
He did request Senate approval to ratify Additional Protocol II, and committed
to "consulting with our allies to develop appropriate methods for incorporating
[Additional Protocol I's] positive provisions into the rules that govern our mili-
tary operations, and as customary international law." 417
Neither of these events has come to pass. The United States is thus only
bound by those protocol provisions reflecting current CIL; yet U.S. forces have
no authoritative way to identify what those might be. For years, the two sources
412. See, e.g., LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 863 (listing violation of capitulation agreements
as a war crime), 1089-91 (identifying grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).
413. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
414. SOLIS, supra note 2, at 82-83.
415. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 75, at 16.
416. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1941, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninterna-
tional Armed Conflicts, concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-2, at 111-V
(1987).
417. Id. at IV.
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commonly identified as being most relevant were a 1986 speech by Deputy
State Department Legal Advisor Michael Matheson, 418 and a short DoD Law of
War Working Group memorandum from that same year. 419 The single defini-
tive pronouncement is President Obama's 2011 determination that the United
States would apply Additional Protocol I Article 75, providing fundamental
protections to individuals falling outside any more protective Geneva Conven-
tion regime, "out of a sense of legal obligation." 420
One would thus expect explicit enumeration of binding provisions from
the Additional Protocols to be a primary function of the DoD Manual. U.S. per-
sonnel, as well as allies fighting alongside them, need to know which of these
rules U.S. forces must follow, and which they can depart from. Regrettably, the
Manual fails badly in this regard.
Chapter 7, for example, addressing the protection of personnel placed
hors de combat by wounds, sickness, or shipwreck, summarizes relevant Addi-
tional Protocol I provisions "to familiarize service members with them in case
U.S. forces are engaged in multinational operations with, or are engaged in
armed conflict against, States that are Parties to Additional Protocol I.",421
While this is helpful, it is even more important for U.S. personnel to know
which of these rules they are legally obligated to follow. But the Manual is si-
lent on that point, just detailing the Protocol's content. And curiously, there are
no parallel sections in the chapters covering other subjects also addressed by
Additional Protocol I.
The Manual's last chapter, labeled a "documentary appendix," provides
"background information" about select texts, including Additional Protocols I
and II.422 Section 19.20 provides some cursory information on each protocol,
noting that "[t]his manual references Additional Protocol I provisions, some of
which are consistent with DoD practice," but then caveats that "[u]nless explic-
itly noted, no determinations are made about whether any of these Additional
Protocol I provisions reflect customary international law." 423
The Manual accomplishes this sidestepping by citing protocol rules with
an anomalous new signal, "consider," which "[i]dentifies a treaty that relates to
the proposition but to which the United States is not a Party (e.g., Additional
Protocol I)." 424 Used repeatedly in conjunction with provisions from both pro-
418. Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Interna-
tional Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 419 (1987).
419. Memorandum from W. Hays Parks et al. to John H. McNeill, Assistant Gen. Couns., Int'l
& Operational L. Dep't. (May 9, 1986), reprinted in LAW OF WAR DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 234-35
(John B. Reese & lain D. Peddon eds., 2011), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdflaw-of-war-
documentary-supplement_2011 .pdf.
420. Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantinamo and Detainee Policy,
WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 7, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-
sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy.
421. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 505.
422. Id. at 1148.
423. Id. at 1170.
424. Id. at 6.
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tocols, the net effect is to leave the reader wholly uncertain as to the legal effect
of these rules for the U.S. military.
The Manual provides some limited, but convoluted, bases for inference
about the applicability of a modest subset of Additional Protocol I provisions.
A reader might thus assume from these captions that U.S. forces are expected
to follow the handful of Additional Protocol I articles identified in those sec-
tions.
(1) 19.20.1.1 Examples of AP I Provisions Incorporated Into Other Trea-
ties That the United States Has Accepted;425
(2) 19.20.1.2 Examples of AP I Provisions That Are Consistent With
Longstanding U.S. Practice;426 and,
(3) 19.20.1.3. Examples of AP I Provisions That the United States Has
Supported;427
However, it would be unclear whether they are doing so as a matter of
law or policy. And it can reasonably be inferred that the Manual's authors do
not consider U.S. forces legally obligated to follow the nine provisions identi-
fied in section 19.20.1.5., "Examples of AP I Provisions to Which the United
States Has Objected," although the complexity of some rules requires careful
reading of cross-referenced sections to try to ascertain the actual scope of U.S.
disagreement.42 8
But what is the reader to make of the status of rules in section 19.20.1.4,
"Examples of AP I Provisions Based on a Principle That the U.S. Supports,
Even Though The Provision Is Not Necessarily Customary International Law
Nor Militarily Acceptable In All Respects?" 429 And what of the many protocol
rules not addressed at all in this chapter?
The Manual's treatment of Additional Protocol H, dealing with non-
international armed conflict, is different but ultimately no more definitive. It
explains that Reagan sought Additional Protocol II ratification; that George W.
Bush asked for a delay after realizing its practical legal significance might be
enhanced by the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,430 and that
Obama requested Senate action again "after interagency review" in 2011.431
Unfortunately, the Manual merely declares "the provisions of Additional Proto-
col II are consistent with U.S. practice; and that any issues could be addressed
with reservations, understandings, and declarations." So, despite purporting to
be a U.S. law of war publication, the Manual never addresses the legal status of
these rules.432 Nor does it identify the "issues" that would need to be addressed
with U.S. reservations-measures which would alter the legal meaning of Ad-
425. Id. at 1177-78.
426. Id. at 1178.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 1179.
429. Id. at 1178.
430. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
431. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1180.
432. See id. at 1180 n.227.
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ditional Protocol II and excuse U.S. forces from following those rules as set
forth in the treaty.
The failure to provide urgently needed legal guidance on the status of
Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II rules critically undermines the
Manual's worth as a practical guide for U.S. military personnel.
B. Format Issues
There are a several reasons for the Manual's excessive length despite its
failure to include key information needed by U.S. military personnel, each of
which adversely affects the Manual's overall utility for its intended audience.
Many chapters, for example, contain extended background discussion of past
approaches, address contrasting views among different commentators, try to
identify every possible combination of circumstances, or every potential use of
a particular term. Little, if any, of this is relevant to personnel needing to de-
termine what rules they must follow today.
Another contributor to the Manual's length is the repetitive discussion of
many subjects in different locations, which are then cross-referenced in foot-
notes.433 Much essentially identical content is thus unnecessarily repeated,
sometimes in immediately adjacent paragraphs.434 Typically little, if any, new
detail is provided in the additional sections, but the coverage of a topic in mul-
tiple separate locations means that a reader must carefully note-and follow-
each of the cross references in order to be sure that they have read all relevant
discussion of an issue. This makes it unnecessarily difficult, and time consum-
ing, to find answers to legal questions.
The December 2016 Manual update addressing proportionality and pre-
cautions in attack provides an extreme example, adding ten pages of text that
must now be read in conjunction with the specific sections on those topics, 435
significantly enhancing the burden on readers trying to ascertain what the Man-
ual requires in these areas. The ten new pages contain eighteen additional
cross-references to other portions of the Manual, further multiplying the burden
on the reader. 436
The challenge of locating specific legal provisions in the Manual is exac-
erbated by its lack of an index. The ability to search the PDF version electroni-
cally provides only partial compensation; the reader still faces the daunting-
and time consuming-task of having to sequence to, and carefully review, each
individual section and footnote containing the search term in order to piece to-
gether the Manual's full treatment of the issue. A well-constructed index could
at least direct the reader to core substantive discussions, while omitting incon-
sequential references and cross-reference footnotes that merely steer the reader
to other substantive content. The DoD may rationalize that it intends primary
distribution of the Manual to be in an electronic format, but it should then pro-
433. See, e.g., LOW MANUAL supra note 1, at 338-39, 341.
434. See, e.g., id. at 293-301.
435. See id. at 241-70.
436. See id. at 241 (plus an additional "compare" citation at 247, n.321).
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vide a hyperlinked version allowing those reading it on computers to jump di-
rectly to core discussion. But it must also recognize that as a practical matter,
many field users will predictably elect to print hard copies, and these readers
are adequately served only if provided a well constructed index.
Although the Manual criticizes the academic practice of including "tan-
gential" information in footnotes, 437 it has so much "below the line" content
that leading law journals would likely be reluctant to print it. Much of this dis-
cussion is exactly the type of extraneous explanation the Manual declaims; it
requires a three-page chart to explain all the Bluebook-style "signals" that it
employs.438 This suggests it was envisioned more as a pseudo-academic tome
than a practical reference for military forces. And it fails to either use quotes or
to acknowledge that some definitions, such as that for "no signal," are lifted
verbatim from the copyrighted Bluebook.4 39
The Manual's treatment of current treaty rules is even more perplexing,
particularly the lengthy recitation of those from the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The applicable rule is typically stated verbatim, or largely verbatim, in the body
of the text without quotation marks or any value-adding supplementary expla-
nation. A footnote then indicates the rule's treaty source followed by the actual
treaty language, this time in quotation marks." 0 An example of this practice,
repeated hundreds of times throughout the Manual, is found in the discussion of
rules from the Third Geneva Convention4 1 addressing POWs, which it styles
as "GPW." Section 9.7.2., "Identity Documents," begins by stating "At no time
should POWs be without identity documents."44 2 This sentence is supported
with a footnote, whose text reads "GPW art. 18 ('At no time should prisoners
of war be without identity documents. )"443 The approach is even more redun-
dant when the Manual addresses provisions common to the 1940 Geneva Con-
ventions covering the sick and wounded in the field (GWS) and at sea (GWS-
Sea).44 In these cases operative language is repeated three times: once in the
text and twice in a footnote quoting serially from both treaties." 5 In compari-
son, the U.K. Manual generally summarizes or paraphrases treaty rules; actual
convention text is placed in quotation marks.44 6 It then just provides short-form
citations in its terse, but thorough, footnoting." 7
437. LOW MANUAL supra note 1, at 2.
438. Id. at 5-7.
439. Compare id. (quoting Bluebook text), with THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION R. 1.2 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (providing the original quoted
source).
440. See, e.g., LOW MANUAL supra note 1, ch. IV, VII, VI, IX, X, and XI (comprising col-
lectively the discussion of rules found in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949).
441. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 42.
442. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 552-53.
443. Id. at 531 n.140
444. See First Geneva Convention and Second Genva Convention, supra note 42.
445. See, e.g., LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 471 n.386
446. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 59, at ix.
447. See, e.g., id. at 152 n.87 (discussing the same rule from Article 18 of the Third Geneva
Convention).
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The DoD Manual is similarly repetitive when borrowing language from
earlier U.S. manuals. As an illustration, the paragraph in section 11.18.2.3, ad-
dressing seizure of property by an occupying power, declares in part: "Valid
capture or seizure of property requires both an intent to take such action and a
physical act of capture or seizure. The mere presence within occupied territory
of property that is subject to appropriation under international law does not op-
erate to vest title thereto in the Occupying Power."" 8 A footnote cites this rule
to paragraph 395 of FM 27-10, and then repeats the entire text in quotation
marks. Obviously a legal manual can find it helpful to "borrow" language that
is either authoritative, such as an actual treaty provision, or particularly well
expressed. But borrowing legalese from a publication lacking international
standing, and reprinting it twice, is illogical. While most FM 27-10 paragraphs
include legal references (typically a Geneva or Hague Convention article), the
DoD Manual omits these, thereby lessening its own credibility.
In several cases, cross-referencing masks the lack of supporting authority
through circular footnoting. This is exemplified by the assertion that enemy ci-
vilian aircraft failing to comply with military instructions are subject to attack,
which is supported only by a cross-reference to a later section. 4 But the refer-
enced text merely repeats the assertion-in a list of grounds for losing protect-
ed status-supported only by a cross-reference back to the original discus-
sion. 4
50
The Manual has a number of flaws that should have been caught via care-
ful editorial review. For example, a work whose military readers will predicta-
bly lack specialized knowledge of international law should not use terms of art,
such as "customary international law," and "innocent passage," without prior
definition. CIL, at least, is eventually explained after several prior appearanc-
es. 45 1 The latter term first appears in a section captioned "Innocent Passage of
Foreign Vessels Through Territorial Seas and Archipelagic Waters." Footnotes
explain the terms "archipelago" and "archipelagic state," 452 but not the more
important "innocent passage," which appears in three subsequent sections but is
never defined.453 The use of "piracy" is uniquely problematic. After appearing
six times previously, 454 a footnote in Chapter 18 finally provides an explication
from U.S. federal law. But that codification, "[w]hoever, on the high seas,
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations ... shall be im-
prisoned for life,"4 55 is useless to a reader unfamiliar with what constitutes pi-
racy under international law, something the Manual never explains.
448. LOW MANUAL, supra note 1, at 781 (quoting DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, T 395 (1956)).
449. See id. at 932.
450. Id. at 936.
451. This term appears multiple times in both the text and footnotes in Chapter 1 before finally
being explained. Id. at 29.
452. See id. at 883 nn.35-36.
453. See id. at 902, 910, 921.
454. Id. at 1, 104-105, 159-160, 888, 891-892, 936-937, 1068 (using the term "piracy" without
definition, or even cross-reference to a definition).
455. Id. at 1121 n.246 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012)) (emphasis added).
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Professional proofreading should have caught internal inconsistencies,
such as the conflict between sections 7.2.1. and 7.3.1.2. The first section states
that GWS-Sea protections are superseded by the GWS once individuals reach
land; the latter says that the GWS-Sea covers persons "stranded on the
,,456
coast". And although the Manual calls for reliance on authoritative citations
reflecting current law rather than visions of what the law should be, several
propositions are supported by sources clearly identifying themselves as aspira-
tional views. 457 These, too, should also have been caught by a careful editor.
CONCLUSION
As the Permanent Court of International Justice famously declared in the
Lotus case, sovereign nations are only bound to follow "the rules of law ...
[that] emanate from their own free will expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law [i.e., customary international
law] .45 Although it may disappoint some critics, it is thus eminently reasona-
ble for a national law of war manual to take a conservative stance and decline
to adopt the aspirational views of non-state entities, such as the recently postu-
lated requirement to capture or wound enemy fighters in preference to killing
them.
What is not reasonable, however, is for DoD in turn to portray the idio-
syncratic views of a small group of its own lawyers as valid expressions of in-
ternational law, which must necessarily reflect at least the general, even if not
unanimous, consensus of the community of nations. While a substantial portion
of the new Manual just uncontroversially restates widely ratified treaty rules, its
overall validity is undermined by the significant number of problematic asser-
tions discretely interspersed throughout its pages, such as the professed legiti-
macy of economic support targeting, the justification of extra-conventional
treatment of "war on terror" detainees, and the claimed right to use expanding
bullets.
These departures from recognized law, coupled with the Manual's routine
reliance on questionable legal authority, problematic understandings of core in-
ternational legal concepts, failure to speak for the U.S. Government as a whole,
and stylistic shortcomings undermine its utility as a reliable legal resource for
either U.S. or international readers. Even the most cynical adherent of realpoli-
tik should recognize that these shortcomings have at least three significant con-
sequences.
First, they represent a substantial breach of faith with the United States'
fighting forces. By failing to adequately reflect agreed upon international rules
in some key areas-such as the universally recognized prohibition on expand-
ing bullets, and its overly aggressive interpretations of what constitute lawful
targets-compliance with the Manual will predictably place U.S. personnel at
real risk of war crimes prosecution by foreign states. And its failure to provide
456. Compare id. at 436-37, with id. at 439.
457. See supra Section III.B.5.
458. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶44 (Sept. 7).
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a comprehensive summary of recognized war crimes does a disservice both to
individual service members seeking to identify rules they must comply with as
well as commanders and judge advocates having to determine whether war
crimes have been committed.
Second, although the Manual itself recognizes the importance of law of
war compliance for maintaining political support for military endeavors, it con-
tains a number of controversial provisions such as excusing U.S. forces for re-
sponsibility for collateral damage to otherwise protected facilities such as hos-
pitals because they are sited near legitimate military objects, or allowing
targeting of civilian infrastructure based merely on the potential for future mili-
tary use. Engaging in this kind of conduct will quickly weaken international
support for the U.S. cause and hand our adversaries propaganda bonanzas that
will facilitate their own efforts at recruiting and solicitation of aid.
And third, it will encourage other states, and potentially even non-state
conflict participants, to take similar liberties with the law, to the detriment of
U.S. national security interests, the safety of U.S. forces, and the larger purpos-
es served by the law in restraining unnecessary violence and loss of human life.
Collectively, the Manual's current shortcomings thus logically outweigh its
value; it will potentially be more helpful to our adversaries, and to those facing
U.S. military prosecution, than to our own fighting forces.
Although the number of specific rules requiring substantive revision are
not a terribly large part of the overall volume, the issues related to redundant
language, extensive cross-referencing, and lack of credible support which un-
dermine the Manual's value as a ready reference for U.S. forces permeate the
entire span of its 1,200 pages. It is thus beyond any prospect for "minor sur-
gery," and should be formally withdrawn until a comprehensive rewrite (and
rigorous interagency review) can be completed.
At this point it would be far more practical for the United States to seek
permission from the U.K. Ministry of Defence--our closest ally-to use their
comparatively concise, well-written, and persuasively supported volume as a
starting point rather than to try to salvage the current U.S. tome. The only really
significant issue requiring modification would be the fact that the United King-
dom is a party to both Additional Protocol I and II while the United States is
not. But the U.S. Government owes it to both our troops and coalition partners
to complete a decades overdue assessment of precisely which provisions of
those agreements it considers to constitute CIL and which it does not. Once that
effort is complete, it would be a very simple matter to tailor the U.K. Manual to
match U.S. legal obligations, and then seek timely interagency review, after
which it could be promulgated as an authoritative Department of Defense Di-
rective over the signature of the Secretary of Defense, or at least as a formal
Joint Publication. The alternative, leaving our individual services to fight joint-
ly yet lacking credible unified guidance on the law of war, should be unac-
ceptable for a nation owing a significant debt to the comparatively small por-
tion of our population that voluntarily undertakes the full burden of our national
defense.
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